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Cannabis is illegal as far as federal law is concerned; yet recent trends in the 
United States indicate it is moving toward more widespread legalization. While both 
sides of the legalization debate pose valid arguments, it has been difficult to assess 
aspects of these arguments in the past. Now that Colorado and Washington have fully 
legalized cannabis, what does data demonstrate to support or rebut these arguments and 
what problems have sporadic legalization led to in the drug control space? This thesis 
examines regulatory, financial, and criminal data in Colorado and Washington to identify 
advantages and disadvantages of legalizing cannabis. Findings indicate 
commercialization of legal cannabis creates a sizeable economic stimulus due to demand 
satisfaction and displacement of drug trafficking organizations for supply. Crime levels 
increased as compared to national averages while drug arrest rates remained stable, which 
could be influenced by other factors. Overall, as a result of disparate national policy, 
Colorado and Washington have become source states for cannabis distribution as findings 
indicate spillage of legal cannabis into black markets nationally. This thesis recommends 
rescheduling cannabis in the Controlled Substances Act to further research the drug while 
increasing state civil asset forfeiture options in prohibitionist states to facilitate criminal 
enforcement. 
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The cannabis legalization debate has long been a contentious issue in the United 
States and throughout the world. Since 1914, cannabis has been regarded as morally 
reprehensible and an overall detractor from society because of negative health effects, 
lack of medical acceptance, and high propensity for abuse. Cannabis is illegal as far as 
federal law is concerned; yet recent trends indicate it is moving toward widespread 
decriminalization, legalization, or both. Pro-cannabis groups argue that significant 
benefits can result from widespread legalization of cannabis, such as easing burdens on 
criminal justice systems, which increases the ability of law enforcement to refocus 
resources, and increased fiscal windfalls.  
On the other side of the argument are anti-drug groups that claim the adverse 
effects are much worse than any benefit that legalization may provide. Some of the 
drawbacks noted by prohibitionist groups are an increase in crime, use among youth, and 
other health issues. Spillage of legal cannabis into black markets and increased 
trafficking of other drugs by criminal or drug trafficking organizations are additional 
concerns.  
The legalization of recreational cannabis in Colorado and Washington can provide 
insight into these claims. Since 2012, when Colorado and Washington voted to legalize 
cannabis, a great deal of data has been collected that can be used to examine further 
issues behind the debate. Using some of this available data, how can some of the 
aforementioned debate claims be supported? What are some of the benefits and 
drawbacks of legalized cannabis in Colorado and Washington as they pertain to 
regulation, finance, and crime? Given the legal disparity in how this drug is accepted, 
what would a workable approach to minimize the negative impacts of cannabis 
legalization promptly involve? 
In an effort to examine the actual debate points that surround cannabis 
legalization further, this thesis seeks to identify what has happened in the areas of 
regulation, finance, and crime between 2012 and today in Colorado and Washington. 
 xvi 
This period of transition from prohibition to full legalization has proven to be a 
substantial issue in the discourse surrounding U.S. drug control strategy. Furthermore, it 
pervades into the international drug control arena, prompting the attention of international 
drug control partners and is an important area of study because Colorado and Washington 
can provide a glimpse of what potential future drug policy may look like.  
Regulatory, financial, and criminal data is analyzed to assess behavior before and 
after legalization to identify advantages and disadvantages of legalization in Colorado 
and Washington. The findings refute or substantiate points on both sides of the debate, 
and as an output, policy recommendations are made to improve identified disadvantages. 
This thesis finds that the number one significant benefit to cannabis legalization is 
the revenue stream created for both the private and public sectors. Findings also indicate 
the commercial aspect of the industry has also had a beneficial trickle-down effect on 
tourism, travel, employment, and the real estate sectors. Another benefit of this trend is 
the potential to outcompete the cannabis black market by providing higher quality 
cannabis at a lower cost for production. In contrast, access to banks is a difficult venture 
for the cannabis industry because banks technically view cannabis revenue as proceeds 
from an illegal business.  
From a social perspective, it appears the commercial nature of the industry 
primarily caters to habitual cannabis consumers (81% who use the drug are considered 
such users, according to the National Institute on Drug Abuse). Consequently, the long-
term driver to operating this type of system is to gain new habitual users. In the near 
term, the industry, and government, advocate for youth education and addiction 
treatment, while in the long term, these efforts conflict with business goals and will 
potentially impede the number one driver of the industry, which is revenue creation. This 
trend parallels other industries, such as the tobacco business, where the health 
consequences are known and an aggressive education program is in place, yet as a result 
of profit motive, the business continues to thrive.  
Another negative effect of disparate legality of cannabis is the potential for 
diversion from the legal system to the black market in other prohibitionist locations. 
 xvii 
Findings indicate when a state legalizes a controlled substance, however, it effectively 
becomes a source state. Consequently, the decreased law enforcement burden in 
cannabis-legal states is transferred to prohibitionist states, which then fuels illegal 
behavior.  
Finally, from a crime perspective, some correlation appears to occur between 
legal cannabis and crime trends in the areas in which it has been legalized. From 2012 to 
2014, the FBI data shows that violent and property crime increased in Colorado and 
Washington, as compared to national averages, which decreased. Cannabis arrests 
decreased, as expected. Other types of drug crime appear to have remained stable with 
the exception of possession arrests for other dangerous non-narcotic drugs. During 2012, 
2013, 2014, and 2015, city crime data from Seattle and Denver both demonstrate 
amplified figures as compared to federal data.  
Some concrete advantages and disadvantages result from cannabis legalization, 
but some level of unity must guide the process at the federal level, rather than relegating 
the management burden to the states. As the matter stands, no national cannabis policy 
exists to guide this trend. Plenty of polls support the narrative on both sides, but the fact 
that the issue is so divisive lends to the idea that the federal government has not taken 
responsibility for getting out in front of the issue. This lack of responsiveness is clearly 
evident in the way individual states are navigating around a paralyzed, rigid federal 
government.  
One consideration both sides of the debate should agree on is the need for a 
definitive scientific study behind the drug. By downgrading cannabis to a Schedule II 
drug, both sides of the debate would know the benefits and risks associated with use and 
would assist in the implementation of a coherent and enforced federal cannabis policy. 
Until additional scientific research can be done outside of the federal government, the 
issue will continue to be divisive. In the short term, states should have the ability to 
enforce their own sovereign laws regardless of neighboring state cannabis laws. If 
individual states have the right to legalize a controlled substance locally, then 
neighboring states should have the right to enact improved civil asset forfeiture that helps 
secure their own population. 
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A. PROBLEM: NATIONAL CANNABIS POLICY INCONSISTENCY 
Less than a decade ago, a 25-year-old man in Denver, Colorado, found with an 
ounce of cannabis by law enforcement would have been arrested for a misdemeanor 
possession of a controlled substance charge, and subject to a 12-month prison sentence. If 
it were his second offense, the charge could have become a felony. On the heels of this 
arrest would have been the negative stigma of being tied to an illicit trade, commonly 
associated with ill repute. Undoubtedly, it would have had a negative impact on the 
man’s future, as well as society.  
Today in Denver, the same man would not face arrest, nor have to contend with a 
criminal record as a result of legalized cannabis in individual states. Much of the United 
States is following this trend when it comes to enforcing cannabis laws. Several foreign 
countries, including Uruguay and Portugal, have fully decriminalized cannabis and 
consider it a medical or recreational drug and treat addiction rather than criminalizing it. 
As of November 2015, in the United States, 23 states, as well as Washington, DC, have 
decriminalized cannabis.  
Cannabis is illegal as far as federal law is concerned; yet recent trends indicate it 
is moving toward widespread decriminalization, legalization, or both. Pro-cannabis 
groups argue that significant benefits can result from widespread legalization of cannabis. 
Some of the benefits of legalization include easing of prosecution and incarceration 
burdens on criminal justice systems and decreasing the impact of criminal records on 
persons arrested for low-level cannabis crimes. Law enforcement can benefit from an 
increase in the ability of law enforcement to refocus resources, while the state can enjoy 
decreased cannabis black markets through effective regulation, combined with increased 
fiscal windfalls.  
On the other side of the argument are anti-drug groups who claim the adverse 
effects are much worse than any benefit that legalization might provide. Some of the 
drawbacks noted by prohibitionist groups are an increase in crime related to cannabis 
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legalization, increased use among youth, and health issues. Additionally, the proliferation 
of legal cannabis into black markets elsewhere, and increased trafficking of other drugs 
by criminal or drug trafficking organizations (DTOs), are valid concerns.  
The legalization of recreational cannabis in Colorado and Washington can provide 
insight into these claims because these states have had recreational cannabis and medical 
cannabis laws in place for the longest duration of any of the states in the United States. 
As a result, it is safe to assume the outcome of legalization in these states will have a 
great impact on future cannabis policy in the United States. Lessons from both states thus 
far can help guide more informed cannabis policymaking in the future.  
B. BACKGROUND 
Cannabis has been listed as a Schedule I controlled substance by the federal 
government for approximately 40 years according to the Controlled Substances Act 
(CSA) of 1970.1 Despite this designation, many states, including Washington, DC, 
currently have medical cannabis laws on the books that enable doctors to prescribe the 
substance for therapeutic purposes.2 Alaska, Colorado, Oregon, and Washington have 
recently legalized recreational cannabis use through state-level ballot initiatives. 
Recreational cannabis takes medical cannabis a step further and creates two conduits for 
dispensing the Schedule I controlled substance. Although only Colorado and Washington 
currently have fully functional recreational regulatory systems, these four states will 
eventually dispense cannabis for recreational use. According to the federal government, 
these states are now acting in the capacities where DTOs are still the primary distributors. 
These states are directly contradicting federal law, as well as international drug control 
treaties; however, they continue to operate.  
Not only are these states operating in this historically illegal space in violation of 
international and federal drug controls, cannabis-legal states appear to have well-
                                                 
1 Office of the Commissioner, “Legislation—Controlled Substances Act,” CSA Part B Sec. 812(c), 
accessed January 5, 2015, http://www.fda.gov/RegulatoryInformation/Legislation/ucm148726.htm#cntlsbb.  
2 “23 Legal Medical Marijuana States and DC,” accessed October 10, 2015, http://medicalmarijuana. 
procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=000881. 
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structured regulatory frameworks for distribution, taxation, and banking.3 These systems 
have brought some level of success along with them. Many other states are looking at the 
matter as a potential tax revenue, tourism, and economic stimulus because dispensaries 
are operated via standard commercial models. Despite the efficient operation of these 
businesses in Colorado and Washington, some drawbacks also appear to have arisen. 
Those states that have yet to decriminalize cannabis are encountering an uptick in drug-
related crime, especially those states that border cannabis-legal states. As an example, 
Nebraska and Oklahoma have challenged Colorado’s recreational cannabis laws in the 
U.S. Supreme Court claiming, “pot is sweeping across their borders.”4  
Anti-cannabis groups argue this contentious relationship will be echoed across the 
United States. Furthermore, the problem will likely intensify as states move forward with 
local adoption of laws decriminalizing and regulating cannabis, in contradiction of the 
federal CSA. Disparity in cannabis policy in the United States could also intensify illicit 
smuggling issues, create instability in legal markets, and fuel criminal behavior. 
Maintaining cannabis as a CSA schedule I controlled substance at the federal level, while 
states simultaneously legislate around current federal and international standards, does 
not send a clear and consistent message to individual states, international drug control 
partners, or U.S. communities at large. Moreover, disparity in regulation and legal 
inconsistencies may create unintended business opportunities for criminal groups and 
DTOs.5  
Since the 1960s, the United States has employed a prohibitionist approach to drug 
control. As a result of this approach, an unparalleled black market for illicit drugs has 
been generated in the United States. By virtue of its geographic location and high demand 
in the United States, Mexico will continue to stand as a funnel point for a lion’s share of 
illicit drugs entering the country. Today, cannabis is the largest illicit drug market in the 
                                                 
3 “Marijuana Enforcement,” accessed December 20, 2014, https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/enforce 
ment/marijuanaenforcement. 
4 Daniel Wallis, “Neighboring States Challenge Colorado Pot Laws in Top U.S. Court,” Reuters, 
December 19, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/19/us-usa-Cannabis-colorado-idUSKBN0JW 
2NH20141219. 
5 David Blake and Jack Finlaw, “Marijuana Legalization in Colorado: Learned Lessons,” Harvard 
Law and Policy Review 8 (2014): 368. 
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United States, while Mexico is the largest producer in North America as a result of the 
low cost of production.6 This situation implies DTOs have a substantial interest in 
maintaining their prevalence in this market. Thus, their involvement with the drug will 
not likely subside in the immediate future. Given the stringent prohibition of cannabis in 
the past, and now the somewhat sudden perception of acceptance, especially in Colorado 
and Washington, questions surrounding the debate will continue to rise to the surface as 
legalization continues. Even in the short time since legalization in these states, some of 
the questions derived from this debate can be answered today.  
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Lacking an environment in which cannabis was fully legal in the United States 
has historically prevented the study of some of the legalization debate claims. Since 
2013, when Colorado and Washington fully legalized cannabis, a great deal of data has 
been collected that can be used to examine issues behind the debate further. Using some 
of this available data, how can some of the debate claims above be supported? What are 
some of the benefits and drawbacks of legalized cannabis in Colorado and Washington as 
they pertain to regulation, finance, and crime? Given the legal disparity in how this drug 
is accepted, what would a workable approach to minimize the negative impacts of 
cannabis legalization promptly involve? 
D. CHALLENGES TO COHERENT CANNABIS POLICY 
Disparities in the legal status of cannabis across the United States will continue to 
provide a grip for cannabis black markets if they go unaddressed. At the national level, 
the law is quite clear about how cannabis should be perceived as a controlled substance 
that is highly addictive and lacks medical acceptance. Unfortunately, the laws are 
haphazardly enforced as they pertain to cannabis in the United States, which has caused 
states to address the issue on their own. This indiscriminate enforcement will likely create 
unintended opportunities for criminal organizations and could potentially impugn the 
                                                 
6 Evelina Gavrilova, Takuma Kamada, and Floris T. Zoutman, “Is Legal Pot Crippling Mexican Drug 
Trafficking Organizations? The Effect of Medical Marijuana Laws on US Crime,” Norges 
Handelshoyskole, Norwegian School of Economics, 2015, 10, http://brage.bibsys.no/xmlui/handle/11250/ 
274521. 
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legal industry in its infancy. Cannabis legal governments have a strong incentive to 
implement effective regulatory schemes designed to outcompete DTOs and to facilitate 
the effective operation of the new industry. For this implementation to happen, 
governments must overcome several challenges that exist for both the legitimate cannabis 
industry, as well as state and local governments nationwide. Those challenges can be 
divided into three areas, which include inconsistent regulation, limited system approach 
to cannabis policy, and criminal organizations.  
E. PURPOSE AND STRUCTURE OF UPCOMING CHAPTERS  
History demonstrates the ebb and flow of acceptance of cannabis over time. Even 
in the short history that cannabis has been used in the Unites States, peaks and valleys 
have occurred as far as its acceptance, and much appears to be driven by the political 
agendas of presidential administrations. At the conclusion of the Carter administration, at 
the national level, momentum grew behind the decriminalization of cannabis and the drug 
was gaining wide acceptance. When the Reagan administration took charge, the war on 
drugs was reinvigorated. As an example, First Lady Nancy Reagan, was a great 
proponent of the drug war and led the charge in the Just Say No campaign.7 Eventually, 
the mainstream public admonished cannabis, which led to firmer criminal enforcement.  
Subsequently, demand for cannabis increased and DTOs filled the supply chain. 
The result was empowered DTOs, increased drug-related violence, and cannabis became 
the most used drug in the United States.8 Despite efforts to stem the supply of illicit 
cannabis entering the United States, DTOs have demonstrated amazing resiliency and an 
impeccable knack for adapting to law enforcement efforts. Since the mid-1990s, cannabis 
has become more widely accepted and even legalized in some areas, and DTOs have 
responded by increasing the flow of illicit cannabis into the market to remain 
competitive.9 As legalization of the drug continues, and it is more widely regulated, key 
                                                 
7 “Nancy Reagan—Her Causes,” accessed February 1, 2016, http://www.reaganfoundation.org/ 
details_f.aspx?p=RR1008NRHC&tx=6. 
8 Beau Kilmer et al., What America’s Users Spend on Illegal Drugs: 2000—2010 (Washington, DC: 




components of licit regulation will emerge and aid policy makers in establishing a more 
rationalized approach to cannabis policy.  
In an effort to examine the actual debate points that surround cannabis 
legalization further, this thesis seeks to identify what has happened in the areas of 
regulation, finance, and crime between 2012 and today in Colorado and Washington. 
This period of transition from prohibition to full legalization has proven to be a 
substantial issue in the discourse surrounding U.S. drug control strategy. Furthermore, it 
pervades into the international drug control arena prompting the attention of international 
drug control partners and is an important area of study because Colorado and Washington 
can provide a glimpse of what potential future policy may look like as it pertains to 
cannabis drug control. These states can demonstrate what happens to a historically illicit 
operation, controlled mostly by DTOs, when the end user suddenly legalizes the drug 
across the board. Given the evolving nature of this emerging trend, this thesis includes 
current research as of November 2015. 
Chapter II of this thesis examines some of the more prominent aspects of the 
cannabis legalization debate by synthesizing available literature as it pertains to 
regulation, finance, and crime. Specifically, it synthesizes local legalization perspectives 
in Colorado and Washington as they have been reported. Understanding the local area 
perspectives in these states, this chapter further expands to encompass literature 
addressing regulation, enforcement, health, taxation, banking, and crime. These areas of 
review have all been impacted by cannabis legalization in some manner. Understanding 
the current conversation lends to greater understanding of the argument; however, also 
understanding the history behind the issue is an important step because it highlights how 
this nation has arrived at this juncture. In terms of future policy, considerable benefit can 
be garnered in understanding how this country has arrived at this point. Mistakes, as well 
as sound strategies, help influence good decisions in the future. Accordingly, Chapter III 
provides the historical context behind the debate. 
Chapter IV provides a comprehensive discussion about the data that is analyzed 
and discussed in Chapter V. Chapter VI synergizes historical information and analysis of 
current data to provide concluding thoughts about the debate in hindsight of the 
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legalization in Colorado and Washington. Chapter VI also provides recommendations for 
overcoming the major negative findings of cannabis legalization in Colorado and 
Washington. The next section of this chapter highlights the methodological approach 
used to analyze the data for this thesis.  
F. DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
As highlighted earlier, three main challenges impede the effective application of a 
coherent cannabis policy in the United States. Those challenges are inconsistent 
regulation, limited system approach to cannabis policy, and criminal organizations. The 
result of these challenges have helped lead to the current disparity in cannabis policy 
today. Behind each of these challenges are complex interactions with regulation, finance, 
and crime. Chapter V analyzes regulation, finance, and crime data in an effort to isolate 
the advantages and disadvantages of legalizing cannabis in Colorado and Washington and 
further discusses implications for prohibitionist states. The next section further elucidates 
the nature of these challenges and how they are examined in support of this thesis.  
1. Inconsistent Regulation 
Cannabis regulation and enforcement practices are disparate at best across the 
United States. Depending on geographic location and level of government (local, state, or 
federal), cannabis is viewed as everything from a medicinal treatment, to a harmful 
controlled substance, similar to heroin or crack cocaine. According to the CSA, cannabis 
is categorized as a Schedule I drug and is considered even more harmful than cocaine 
because it has been deemed by the federal government to have no medical application. 
Cocaine, a Schedule II controlled substance, does have medical application according to 
the CSA.10 All at once, cannabis can be sold for recreational or medical use by either a 
licensed and regulated business recognized by a cannabis-legal state, or by a drug dealer 
from the trunk of a car in a parking garage. Understandably, this sale of cannabis can 
consequently fuel illicit behavior.  
                                                 
10 Office of the Commissioner, “Legislation—Controlled Substances Act.” 
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This thesis analyzes the major components of the cannabis regulatory systems of 
Colorado and Washington, where cannabis has been legalized. Both states maintain 
cannabis regulation through agencies that govern the industry like alcohol; however, 
other options for regulation exist that may have variable impacts on other factors. 
Industry control, long and short-term policy influence, economy, operational cost of 
regulation, black markets, crime, and price are some of the factors that regulation will 
influence. While the trend of cannabis legalization continues across the United States, the 
first two states to legalize cannabis for recreational use have collected crime, drug use, 
and fiscal data. This information, while somewhat new, can be analyzed to determine the 
behavior in these areas since the implementation of the first two large cannabis regulatory 
systems in the country. 
2. Limited System Approach to Cannabis Policy  
Cannabis regulation is limited in scope because regardless of the level of 
government, no one is on the same page. New laws have been crafted at state or 
municipal levels of government and frequently conflict with federal law, or each other in 
some cases. At the federal level, however, enforcement has been lax outside of the 
parameters established by the Department of Justice’s (DOJ’s) Ogden and Cole 
Memoranda, which are discussed further later in this thesis. These memoranda outline 
major criminal activity that will be prosecuted at the federal level.11 While the federal 
CSA is still being enforced against major drug crimes, individual states are left to deal 
with lower level drug trafficking on their own, while cannabis trafficking activity 
migrates to less competitive areas, such as prohibitionist states, or poorly regulated areas. 
Theoretically, prohibitionist states will expend a greater amount of law 
enforcement resources enforcing new crime trends, such as increased interstate cannabis 
trafficking, while states that legalize and regulate cannabis will expend regulatory 
resources, while concurrently generating tax revenue. Colorado and Kansas represent two 
states where this phenomenon occurs. From a system-wide view, some government 
                                                 
11 James M. Cole, Memorandum for All United States Attorneys, Guidance Regarding Marijuana 
Enforcement (Washington, DC: The Deputy Attorney General, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ 
resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf. 
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efforts cancel out resources put forth by other governments. As a result of a lack of 
system thinking, the total resource allocation across the nation by federal, state, and local 
governments addressing legal and non-legal cannabis becomes a zero-sum game.  
Since the legalization of retail cannabis in Colorado and Washington, both states 
have maintained tax revenue records based on the production and sale of cannabis in their 
states. Tax revenue data is available from both state governments on a monthly basis, 
originating from the inception of legalized retail sales in 2014. The analysis in Chapter V 
examines how tax revenues have trended between 2012 and 2015, before and after 
legalization in each state, and discusses potential factors that might explain these trends. 
3. Criminal Organizations 
Along with the issues surrounding drug control and its varying levels of legality 
throughout the world and within the United States, come challenges of supply and 
demand. Historically, the prohibition of a substance has created explosive business 
opportunities for criminal enterprise. In response to legal cannabis, DTOs have found a 
variety of loopholes that allow them to continue operating in this space. The approach in 
the United States has been to address the issue through criminal justice systems. 
Unfortunately, as law enforcement efforts attempt to limit supply, it also causes demand 
to increase. DTOs have filled this void seamlessly, regardless of the resources allocated 
to stop them. Coinciding with pro-legalization arguments, DTOs appear to be losing 
market share in areas in which cannabis is more effectively regulated. Conventional 
wisdom dictates they will likely hedge their losses via other illicit businesses.12 
Hypothetically, crime should be affected by cannabis legalization. With cannabis 
no longer illegal within defined areas of state laws, petty cannabis drug offenses should 
decrease. Given a decrease in cannabis crime, questions remain regarding presumed 
resource excess in law enforcement. Questions are also raised regarding DTO adaptation. 
Given that market share of cannabis will be lost, some questions remain about how DTOs 
and criminal groups will manage the loss.  
                                                 
12 “Criminal Commodities: Marijuana,” accessed October 21, 2015, https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/ 
criminal-commodities-marijuana. 
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Understanding that regulatory systems are just being implemented in this area, the 
level of effectiveness of governments to replace DTOs as the top supplier of cannabis 
may take some time and adjustment. Theoretically, an indicator of effectiveness of 
regulation in these areas is a migration of DTO and illicit activity to other drug types and 
criminal activity. Given a potential to lose market share in the cannabis marketplace, 
these DTOs should presumably target other states for cannabis distribution where 
demand remains high due to the drug’s illicit status. Given higher quality cannabis, 
improved regulation in certain areas, and higher cost of distribution to DTOs, the 
assumption is that DTOs will simply hedge their cannabis market loss by investing in 
other drug markets or types of crime. To that end, this thesis also analyzes the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI’s) Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR), specifically focused 
on drug crime in Washington and Colorado to determine if cannabis arrests are 
decreasing and if arrests for other types of drug activity are increasing. These figures are 
also compared against national averages. As a means of validity testing in population-
dense areas, a similar analysis is also conducted using arrest data retrieved from Denver 
and Seattle police departments.  
Public discourse has focused on the revenue windfalls of legal cannabis only, 
while simultaneously almost no focus has been placed on tradeoffs for these windfalls. 
Consequently, the public has not realized the true return on legal cannabis. In light of 
criminal organizations potentially losing their control of cannabis markets, or any other 
number of unidentified tradeoffs, a shift will inevitably occur in how they do business in 
the future. For every action, an equal and opposite reaction results, even in the case of 
criminal enterprises.13  
G. SUMMARY 
A clear examination of what is happening in terms of revenue windfalls and 
economic stimulus is undertaken to understand fully the influence of the commercial 
impacts of cannabis industry. While much of the public discourse has focused on the 
                                                 
13 Jim Lucas, “Equal & Opposite Reactions: Newton’s Third Law of Motion,” LiveScience, June 26, 
2014, http://www.livescience.com/46561-newton-third-law.html. 
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benefits of revenues from the licit cannabis industry, little public focus has been on the 
tradeoffs made for those revenues. Depending on crime response to legalization, 
unknown costs may be associated with migrating crime patterns, interstate diversion, or 
other unintended consequences. In this case, these costs have an offsetting effect on the 
revenues that have been generated. This facet of the debate is further examined with the 
expectation that analytic results can help identify both advantages and disadvantages 
realized from the Colorado and Washington legalization experiment.  
Legalization of a formerly controlled substance should demonstrate effects, which 
would be identifiable in crime and financial data. Specifically, arrests for various types of 
crime should change in concert with changing law enforcement priorities. As cannabis 
possession is no longer being criminally enforced in both states, law enforcement 
agencies should have the resource capacity to realign their efforts to enforce drug laws in 
other illicit drug areas, such as crack cocaine, heroin, methamphetamine, and 
methylenedioxy-methamphetamine (MDMA). Consequently, arrests for the production 
and possession in other drug categories should occur more frequently as law enforcement 
resource excess is realigned to address other illegal drug types.  
Making cannabis legal may have a detrimental effect on business activities of 
criminal organizations because their production and distribution costs would 
consequently increase. If this effect were the case, the expectation would be a hedge of 
losses through an increase of activity in other criminal areas, not just within the scope of 
illegal drugs. The FBI’s UCR crime statistics in Colorado and Washington are examined 
to discern substantial criminal trend activity that might indicate the displacement of 
cannabis-related crime to other crime types.  
This chapter has examined how attitudes toward cannabis have changed in the last 
10 years toward a more tolerated, and in many areas, a legally accepted drug. Areas in 
which the drug has been legalized have reported some success in the areas of taxation and 
economic stimulus. Issues involving how to structure licit supply alternatives, crime 
adaptation, regulatory inconsistencies, and waste of resources from a macro level have 
been persistent trouble spots for governments, as well as the cannabis industry. To 
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understand these problems, the next chapter focuses on a review of literature surrounding 
these areas.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter focuses on a review of available literature in several categories. 
These categories include legalization impacts in Colorado and Washington, regulatory 
methodologies, health, taxation, banking, and serious crime. Widespread cannabis 
legalization is in its infancy in the United States; thus, undoubtedly, many unanticipated 
effects may be felt for years to come. This thesis aims to identify challenges to creating 
domestic cannabis policy based on what is known so far about the Colorado and 
Washington legalization experience. Moreover, this thesis seeks to identify policy 
recommendations that rectify significant deficiencies identified in Colorado and 
Washington as a result of this thesis.   
B. REVIEW AND SYNTHESIS 
The next two sections review available literature that highlights the measures 
taken by Colorado and Washington toward full cannabis legalization. Given that no other 
state has legalized a federally controlled substance before Colorado and Washington, 
both sections review literature that address how voter ballot initiatives succeeded, and 
how the states moved to regulate the new industry. Following the first two sections, 
which are state specific, additional sections expound on externally impacted areas of 
regulation, enforcement, health, taxation, banking, and crime.  
1. Legalization Perspective in Colorado 
Cannabis has been legal in Colorado for medicinal use since the early 2000s. 
“Marijuana Legalization in Colorado: Learned Lessons” explains that patients who 
demonstrated debilitating medical conditions were eligible to apply for a government 
issued identification, or red card, and legally purchase medical cannabis from any 
number of state-regulated dispensaries:14 “In early 2012, proponents of recreational 
cannabis legalization gathered enough signatures to place an amendment to the Colorado 
                                                 
14 Blake and Finlaw, “Marijuana Legalization in Colorado: Learned Lessons,” 359. 
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Constitution on the statewide ballot,” known as Amendment 64.15 This law was passed in 
November 2012, and is now codified in the Colorado Constitution as Article XVIII, 
Section 16.16 Amendment 64 was not believed to have enough political momentum 
behind it because, for starters, it raised significant state’s rights issues. Additionally, the 
legal operations of dispensaries hinged on the ability to move proceeds through the 
federal banking system, which were reticent to handle these proceeds for fear of asset 
seizure laws connected to profits gained from illicit activities. Finally, significant 
concerns were raised relating to the laws of neighboring states, which have recently come 
to light. States of Nebraska and Oklahoma v. State of Colorado highlights that Nebraska 
and Oklahoma have challenged Colorado’s recreational cannabis laws in the U.S. 
Supreme Court; however, the court has yet to accept the case.17  
Early indicators of crime, tax revenue, and tourism in the Denver area point to 
positive trends according to “Colorado Cannabis Statistics Prove Law Enforcement Was 
Wrong” in that property and violent crimes decreased in Denver, while tax revenues, 
tourism, and air travel into the area have notably increased.18 These indicators bode well 
for Denver and seem to point toward a boost in the economy for the state. However, these 
indicators fail to examine the impacts legalization has had on regulatory and enforcement 
efforts in Colorado. Additionally, the impact to national/international drug control 
strategies has yet to be assessed. 
According to “Colorado Police Chiefs Ask for More Money for Cannabis 
Enforcement,” concern has arisen that the state’s projected tax revenue for fiscal year 
2015 is not going to be invested in increasing the effectiveness of the state’s law 
enforcement enterprise. The Colorado Association of Chiefs of Police contention is that 
                                                 
15 Blake and Finlaw, “Marijuana Legalization in Colorado: Learned Lessons,” 359. 
16 Ibid. 
17 States of Nebraska and Oklahoma v. State of Colorado (December 2014). 
18 David Dunford, “Colorado Cannabis Statistics Prove Law Enforcement Was Wrong,” The Inquisitr, 
April 10, 2014, http://www.inquisitr.com/1208249/colorado-cannabis-statistics-prove-law-enforcement-
was-wrong/. 
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more investment should occur in the area of impaired driver training, oral fluid testing, 
and the creation of a state cannabis crimes database.19  
In Colorado, despite the pros and cons of legalization, it is evident that all 
stakeholders involved are aggressively attempting to work out the issues entailed with a 
rapid stand-up of public policy, regulatory/enforcement infrastructure, and at face value, 
the great experiment seems to be going well within the state. Sparse cases have occurred 
in which children have ended up being hospitalized after eating edible cannabis, and 
several cannabis-related deaths have occurred. For the most part, the projected doom and 
gloom of legalization in Colorado has not occurred yet.  
“Legalizing a Market for Cannabis for Pleasure: Colorado, Washington, Uruguay 
and beyond: Legalising a Market for Cannabis” denotes Colorado has entered into the 
recreational cannabis business too hastily at the behest of private sector interest rather 
than public health interests.20 The report, authored by Robin Room, covers health, and 
more specifically, discusses international drug control and advocates for a revised 
scheduling of both cannabis and alcohol to bolster regulatory and health infrastructures in 
places like Colorado.21 Room does not address organized crime surrounding the issue, 
however, and opts to cover the matter from more of a use prevention standpoint via 
increased regulation. While Room’s assertions are geared for the improvement of public 
health, part of her argument is that higher prices will discourage use; however, the article 
fails to consider the black market and its propensity to undercut pricing in the legal 
cannabis market. A breakeven point exists at which consumers will resort to the black 
market for product; thereby, impugning the integrity of licit markets.  
                                                 
19 “Colorado Police Chiefs Ask for More Money for Cannabis Enforcement,” accessed December 20, 
2014, http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_25283504/colorado-police-chiefs-ask-more-money-cannabis-
enforcement. 
20 Robin Room, “Legalizing a Market for Cannabis for Pleasure: Colorado, Washington, Uruguay and 
beyond: Legalising a Market for Cannabis,” Addiction 109, no. 3 (March 2014): 345–51, doi:10.1111/add. 
12355. 
21 Ibid., 345. 
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2. Legalization Perspective in Washington 
While Colorado is effectively conducting its own experiment with legalized 
cannabis, Washington has had its own experience. “Cannabis Policy Reforms in the 
Americas: A Comparative Analysis of Colorado, Washington, and Uruguay” conducts a 
comparative analysis between states that have fully legalized cannabis for recreational 
use. Bryce Pardo, the author, clearly lays out how Initiative I-502, a Washington ballot 
initiative, was successfully passed in November 2012.22 Pardo continues with a 
comparative analysis of the laws that govern the legal cannabis industries in both states. 
While his analysis is thorough, it fails to account for the displacement of the cannabis 
black market nor does it describe the effective measures across both infrastructures, 
which degrade the ability of DTOs to operate in those states.  
Federal Proposals to Tax Marijuana: An Economic Analysis conducts an 
economic analysis of the cannabis industries in both Washington and Colorado with a 
specific focus on issues surrounding a potential federal cannabis tax.23 Both authors fully 
describe both Amendment 64 in Colorado, and Amendment I-502 in Washington, the 
ballot initiatives leading to legalization in both states. The authors extensively examine 
the idea of leveraging ad valorem taxes at the federal level to discourage youth use, 
generate federal revenue, and further fund federal regulation. With respect to Washington 
State, the report conceptualizes how price points will be determined in coordination with 
the state. Unfortunately, the report does not recognize the improbability of levying a 
federal tax on Washington’s legal cannabis industry in light of the federal prohibition of 
the drug.  
Options and Issues Regarding Marijuana Legalization discusses legislative 
options regarding cannabis legalization in Washington, as well as other localities. The 
Rand Corporation published this report and it contemplates key decisions that 
                                                 
22 Bryce Pardo, “Cannabis Policy Reforms in the Americas: A Comparative Analysis of Colorado, 
Washington, and Uruguay,” International Journal of Drug Policy 25, no. 4 (July 2014): 729, doi:10.1016/j. 
drugpo.2014.05.010.  
23 Sean Lowery and Jane Gravelle, Federal Proposals to Tax Marijuana: An Economic Analysis (CSR 
Report No. R43785) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2014), 3, https://www.hsdl.org/? 
view&did=760029.  
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governments would need to evaluate in the event they decide to legalize within their 
jurisdiction. Key topics receiving discussion include 12 supply alternatives, regulation, 
and the costs and benefits of legalizing cannabis.24 This report provides a broad variety 
of factors for consideration and provides a solid example of the complexity behind the 
cannabis legalization trend. This report focuses on legislative decision making rather than 
the potential influence of DTOs on this new market. Many of the points Caulkins et al. 
discuss are also covered in several of the following topics, such as taxation and health.  
3. Regulation, Enforcement, and Health 
Health is an important facet of this issue. In 20 states, medical cannabis is seen as 
a remedy to some common ailments, such as chronic pain and nausea associated with 
chemotherapy treatments. Many bodies of research examine the medicinal properties of 
cannabis and several originate in Colorado. As a whole, the medical community still 
widely regards medical cannabis taboo as a legitimate medical treatment, however.  
In Colorado, for example, “Colorado Family Physicians’ Attitudes toward 
Medical Cannabis,” indicates that Colorado Family Physicians’ generally believed 
cannabis poses serious mental and physical health risks and that more medical education 
is needed.25 Such results seem to denote the medical community does not widely 
recognize cannabis as a medically beneficial treatment, which might lead to the idea that 
the supposed medical benefit of the drug is more of an excuse to acquire the drug legally, 
as opposed to actually using it for legitimate medical purposes.  
“Colorado Tackles Medical Implications of Cannabis” indicates a physician can 
make a recommendation for something in excess of two ounces or six plants, but 
Colorado’s Marijuana Enforcement Division has recommended a decrease in this 
amount. Medically speaking, no evidence really exists of a dose-related response to 
                                                 
24 Jonathan P. Caulkins et al., Options and Issues Regarding Marijuana Legalization, Perspectives 
(Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2015), 12, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspec 
tives/PE100/PE149/RAND_PE149.pdf. 
25 Elin Kondrad and Alfred Reid, “Colorado Family Physicians’ Attitudes toward Medical Cannabis,” 
The Journal of the American Board of Family Medicine 26, no. 1 (2013): 59. 
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cannabis from a medical standpoint.26 This aspect of regulation can help decrease 
diversion activity.  
“Adverse Health Effects of Marijuana Use,” a recent article published in the New 
England Journal of Medicine, concluded that despite recent popularity, cannabis poses 
some very serious health concerns. These concerns include addiction, impaired brain 
development, influence on addictive behaviors toward other drugs, potential mental 
illness, negative effect on academic performance and achievement, cancer, and motor 
vehicle accident risk.27 Summarily, the authors hypothesize that similar to alcohol or 
cigarettes, legalizing cannabis will eventually lead to increased use, and thus, present 
more of these types of issues among the population. Simply put, as a result of its 
illegality, the health problems associated with use have not yet become apparent on a 
widespread basis.28  
Mohammed Mir, author of “Alcohol and Marijuana Use While Driving—An 
Unexpected Crash Risk in Pakistani Commercial Drivers: A Cross-sectional Survey,” 
conducted a study of drivers in Pakistan regarding the use of cannabis while driving. The 
study revealed that almost 23% of the participants used cannabis while driving. Of all 
drivers who reported vehicle accidents in the past five years, nearly 30% of the drivers 
used cannabis, as compared with 22% of those who did not report having accidents.29 
This percentage would insinuate the possibility of a vehicle accident is higher while using 
cannabis, although the study does not consider the lack of law enforcement in the realm 
of driving under the influence in Pakistan.  
“Blunt the Violence: How Legal Marijuana Regulation in the United States Can 
Help End the Cartel Violence in Mexico” highlights how the war on drugs, specifically 
                                                 
26 Bridget M. Kuehn, “Colorado Tackles Medical Implications of Cannabis,” The Journal of the 
American Medical Association 311, no. 20 (May 28, 2014): 2053, http://search.proquest.com.libproxy. 
nps.edu/docview/1536166472?accountid=12702. 
27 Nora D. Volkow et al., “Adverse Health Effects of Marijuana Use,” New England Journal of 
Medicine 370, no. 23 (June 5, 2014): 2219–27, doi:10.1056/NEJMra1402309. 
28 Ibid., 2225–2226. 
29 Mohammed U. Mir et al., “Alcohol and Marijuana Use While Driving—An Unexpected Crash Risk 
in Pakistani Commercial Drivers: A Cross-Sectional Survey,” Biomedical Central Public Health 12, no. 
145 (February 27, 2012): 3, doi:10.1186/1471-2458-12-145.  
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cannabis, has inflamed tensions in Mexico, and created powerful drug cartels who have 
gained enough strength to oppose military and federal government efforts directly to 
impede their growth.30 The author describes the ideal situation where loosened licensing, 
relaxed taxation, higher sellable quantity, and elimination of state/federal entanglements 
can eliminate DTO involvement in licit cannabis business.31 This study advocates for a 
liberal regulatory approach to the licit cannabis business and posits the competition 
created would degrade illicit revenue streams to DTOs in Mexico.  
“A Critical Appraisal of the Department of Justice’s New Approach to Medical 
Marijuana” identifies how Colorado established the regulatory arm under the Colorado 
Department of Revenue in response to a 2009 DOJ memorandum, known as the Ogden 
Memo because the Deputy U.S. Attorney General, David Ogden, authored it.32 In this 
memo to all U.S. attorneys, the Department deprioritized cannabis prosecutions and 
transferred the risk evaluation of the sale of cannabis to states. Subsequently, Colorado’s 
legislature directed the state to regulate the sale of illicit drugs and this act directly 
contradicted federal law.33  
The 2015 Preview of Marijuana in Colorado the Impact is comprised of open 
source statistics from various municipal, state, and federal agencies regarding cannabis 
legalization.34 The report covered impaired driving in Colorado, youth use rates, adult 
use rates, emergency room and hospital visits for cannabis, child exposures to cannabis, 
diversion, tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) extraction lab explosions, and crime.35 This 
report provides a unique insight into these issues in that the majority of the content is 
                                                 
30 Andrés E. Muñoz, “Blunt the Violence: How Legal Marijuana Regulation in the United States Can 
Help End the Cartel Violence in Mexico,” Seattle Journal for Social Justice 13 (2014): 691. 
31 Ibid., 729. 
32 Robert A. Mikos, “A Critical Appraisal of the Department of Justice’s New Approach to Medical 
Marijuana,” Vanderbilt Public Law Research Paper, no. 11–07, Stanford Law & Policy Review 22 
(February 23, 2011): 633. 
33 States of Nebraska and Oklahoma v. State of Colorado at 7. 
34 Kevin Wong and Chelsey Clarke, The Legalization of Marijuana in Colorado, The Impact, Volume 
3, Preview 2015 (Denver, CO: Rocky Mountain High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area, 2015), http://www. 
rmhidta.org/html/2015%20PREVIEW%20Legalization%20of%20MJ%20in%20Colorado%20the%20Impa
ct.pdf. 
35 Ibid., 1–50.  
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derived from law enforcement statistics. Alarmingly, all the areas covered by this report 
demonstrate an upward trend, and in some cases, a several thousand percent increase is 
present. For example, between 2010 and 2014, the diversion of Colorado cannabis by 
parcel increased over 2,000%.36 The report demonstrates the lack of coordination 
between law enforcement agencies and the state government and implies the state is more 
concerned with regulation and taxation.  
From an enforcement perspective, the aforementioned literature resources identify 
how the industry will be regulated and how risk will be assessed and managed within the 
industry, but fail to cover enforcement issues external to the infrastructure. Price 
undercutting, diversion, smuggling, and intertwining of DTOs and legitimate business 
was not a topic readily identified in available resources. These issues demonstrate a 
serious gap in available literature.  
4. Taxation and Banking 
“Cannabis Tax Millions? Hallucinations up in Smoke, Yet Feds Propose 50% 
Federal Tax Too” outlines how Colorado’s administrative design for the taxation of both 
medical and recreational cannabis has demonstrated extraordinary revenue generating 
potential. During the first full year of taxation of recreational cannabis, tax revenues 
topped $58.7 million.37 The author highlights that striking an effective balance between 
excessive taxation, which propels black-market distribution, and under-taxation, which 
renders the enterprise ineffective, seems to be the evolving driver in the system.  
“Cannabis Policy Reforms in the Americas: A Comparative Analysis of Colorado, 
Washington, and Uruguay” makes a strong case for cannabis taxation reform in both 
Washington and Colorado indicating that both states levy an ad valorem tax based on 
weight and not unit of THC.38 The author extensively covers taxation models of both 
                                                 
36 Wong and Clarke, The Legalization of Marijuana in Colorado, The Impact, Volume 3, Preview 
2015, 24. 
37 Robert W. Wood, “Cannabis Tax Millions? Hallucinations up in Smoke, Yet Feds Propose 50% 
Federal Tax Too,” January 11, 2015, 1, http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2015/01/11/marijuana-tax-
millions-hallucinations-up-in-smoke-yet-feds-propose-a-50-federal-tax-too/#6b2cab7971c0. 
38 Pardo, “Cannabis Policy Reforms in the Americas: A Comparative Analysis of Colorado, 
Washington, and Uruguay,” 733. 
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states and Uruguay, and highlights important long-term taxation principles, such as 
taxation of psychotropic chemical content versus weight alone. This literature is 
important because effective taxation is a key component in replacing DTOs and the illicit 
black market.  
Additionally, Federal Proposals to Tax Marijuana: An Economic Analysis alludes 
to evolving sensitivities of the U.S. banking system, which can facilitate success in this 
sensitive area.39 In effect, tax revenues in Colorado are being driven by proceeds from an 
illicit business in the eyes of federal government banking laws. As a result of the inability 
of the cannabis industry to conduct banking transactions legally, great concern has arisen, 
as with any large cash business, that criminal organizations will infiltrate the business. As 
a result, the state, DOJ, and U.S. Treasury Department deprioritized banking regulation 
of licit cannabis revenue. Technically, however, injection of these proceeds into the 
banking system is still illegal according to federal law. At the federal level, however, 
“Polis, Blumenauer Bills De-Federalize Cannabis Prohibition” indicates the Cannabis 
Tax Equity Act and the Ending Cannabis Prohibition Act, are strong indicators that a 
continued push to both remove cannabis from the Controlled Substances Act will still 
occur, as well as opening the door for federal taxation and regulation.40  
5. Crime 
The cornerstone of drug control in the United States is the CSA. This statute 
ushered in drug control, as it is known in the United States in 1970, and was the 
conveyance for implementing the U.N. Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. The CSA 
delineates drugs by levels of medical application, potential for abuse, and level of safety, 
and they are categorized by schedules within the CSA.41 The CSA has important 
implications to this thesis because it the blueprint behind how drugs, cannabis in this 
case, are addressed by federal law. Subsequently, state laws have historically been crafted 
to accommodate the CSA. This trend has changed in light of legalized cannabis.  
                                                 
39 Lowery and Gravelle, Federal Proposals to Tax Marijuana: An Economic Analysis. 
40 “Polis, Blumenauer Bills De-Federalize Cannabis Prohibition,” accessed January 4, 2015, 2, 
http://polis.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=318723.  
41 Office of the Commissioner, “Legislation—Controlled Substances Act.” 
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With the deprioritized federal enforcement of cannabis laws in the United States, 
State Marijuana Legalization Initiatives: Implications for Federal Law Enforcement 
estimates that organized criminal networks will be substantially impacted in terms of 
income raised from the smuggling and distribution of cannabis.42 Specifically, Mexican 
organized crime stands to lose the greatest market share of the cannabis industry through 
well-regulated decriminalization efforts in the United States. This estimate fails to assess 
whether drug trafficking organizations will hedge their losses on other types of controlled 
substances, such as heroin, cocaine, or crystal methamphetamine. The Organization of 
American States (OAS) estimates that at the extreme, Mexican DTOs stand to lose 
approximately 20 to 25 percent of their drug export income, but estimating how they will 
compensate for this loss has yet to be identified.43 “Is Legal Pot Crippling Mexican Drug 
Trafficking Organizations? The Effect of Medical Marijuana Laws on U.S. Crime” 
asserts that in the case of medical cannabis, the supply chain of the drug is legal and has a 
positive impact in decreasing violence among Mexican DTOs.44 Additionally, the 
authors assert the drug war has had little impact on cannabis accessibility, but sizeable 
negative effects on criminal violence related to the drug.45 It would suggest that DTOs 
would simply hedge losses by investing in other activities.  
As an additional obstacle to DTO involvement in the distribution of black market 
cannabis, “Court Ruling Could Pave Way for Marijuana Legalization in Mexico” 
highlights that the Mexican Supreme Court ruled that it is a civil right in Mexico to be 
able to transport, grow, and possess small amounts of cannabis. It is a significant legal 
ruling because it clears the way for cannabis to be decriminalized in Mexico. 
                                                 
42 Lisa N. Sacco and Kristin Finklea, State Marijuana Legalization Initiatives: Implications for 
Federal Law Enforcement (CRS Report No. R43164) (Washington, DC; Congressional Research Service, 
2014), 22, http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43164.pdf. 
43 Ibid., 18. 
44 Gavrilova, Kamada, and Zoutman, “Is Legal Pot Crippling Mexican Drug Trafficking 
Organizations? The Effect of Medical Marijuana Laws on US Crime,” 28. 
45 Ibid. 
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Additionally, the authors assert it could be the beginning of a more widespread tolerance 
of cannabis in that country, following a similar path to the one the United States has.46  
From the federal-level perspective, reallocation of enforcement resources from 
cannabis enforcement, combined with income from taxation of the drug, stands to save 
and generate a significant amount of revenue potential. In 1999 dollars, this potential was 
estimated to be $9.4 billion according to “The Economics of the Drug War: Effective 
Federal Policy of Missed Opportunity?”47 Given the potential loss from cannabis 
trafficking and possibility of increased trafficking in other areas, an existing gap occurs in 
determining if and how cannabis tax revenues can be reallocated to other drug 
enforcement priorities that emerge.  
The DOJ weighed in significantly in 2009, and again in 2012, the years medical 
and recreational cannabis laws were enacted. In 2009, the DOJ Ogden Memorandum, 
titled after Deputy Attorney General David Ogden, realigned department priorities to 
deprioritize medical cannabis enforcement.48 Again, it occurred in 2012 with the Cole 
Memorandum, authored by Deputy Attorney General James Cole. This memorandum 
deprioritized recreational cannabis enforcement.49 In both cases, the federal government 
departed from what had historically been strict adherence to the CSA. This guidance is 
significant to this thesis because these guidelines have realigned the enforcement efforts 
behind the CSA, which represents a substantial shift in drug control policy at the federal 
level. 
The FBI’s UCR tracks crime in the United States on an annual basis. It provides 
information on the type of personal crime, such as homicide, rape, and assault, and 
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property crimes, such as theft, burglary, and robbery.50 As a secondary data set, it tracks 
drug offenses and breaks them down by type of drug.51 This data is useful in assessing 
arrests trends at the federal level for all drug types from 2012, the year prior to 
legalization in Colorado, to 2014, the most current data available.  
Denver and Seattle police departments both have house crime statistic offices, 
with robust crime reporting data. The Denver Police Department maintains statistical 
information along the same lines as the FBI’s UCR.52 This information can be 
comparatively assessed by year from 2012 to 2015. The Seattle Police Department 
monitors crime trends using a publically accessible website identified as the Seattle 
Crime Dashboard (SCD).53 Similar to both the UCR and Denver police site, this site 
allows users to analyze drug arrest trends across multiple years, type of drug, and type of 
arrest. Use of the three systems allows for analysis at the federal, state, and city (Denver 
and Washington) levels.  
C. SUMMARY  
“Shifting Drug Policy: The Politics of Marijuana in the 21st Century” provides an 
excellent historical review of drug control in the United States. The thesis covers the 
issue of drug control but opens the door to the need for future research in the area of 
regulation and enforcement.54 A Century of International Drug Control provides a 
thorough analysis of how global drug control policy is administered by the United 
Nations.55 This report is limited in that its publication date was 2009, prior to widespread 
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decriminalization efforts. “Marijuana Legalization in Colorado: Learned Lessons”56 
covers a litany of legalization issues specific to Colorado. Unfortunately, the authors lack 
sensitivity to anti-legalization stakeholder interests and put forth a purely pro-cannabis 
agenda. Of value are the identified needs to explore the role of drug-trafficking 
organizations further and their impact on the fledgling cannabis industry. Similarly, 
Options and Issues Regarding Marijuana Legalization,57 and “The Marijuana 
Legalization Debate,”58 covers potential legislative decision points pertinent to 
Washington State. Discussion of contesting black markets in Washington via specific 
regulatory practice is minimal.  
“Colorado Marijuana Statistics Prove Law Enforcement Was Wrong,”59 
“Colorado Police Chiefs Ask for More Money for Marijuana Enforcement,”60 
Neighboring States Challenge Colorado Pot Laws in Top U.S. Court,”61 and State 
Marijuana Legalization Initiatives: Implications for Federal Law Enforcement,62 all 
touch on the various issues regarding enforcement, banking, and taxation. However, they 
fail to accommodate the potential for organized crime involvement with the industry. 
More importantly, given the potential for criminal involvement with the industry, 
literature is lacking that directly identifies effective regulatory controls that mitigate the 
incentives of operating in a black market. 
“Trends in Fatal Motor Vehicle Crashes before and after Marijuana 
Commercialization in Colorado,”63 “Colorado Family Physicians’ Attitudes toward 
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Medical Marijuana,”64 and “Colorado Tackles Medical Implications of Marijuana”65 all 
cover the health implications of cannabis decriminalization both throughout the United 
States and in Colorado alone. In these resources, a limited amount of historical data is 
available from which to draw conclusions as a result of the relatively new laws. This area 
will need additional research. 
Federal Proposals to Tax Marijuana: An Economic Analysis is a review for the 
Congressional Research Service of current plans to apply a federal cannabis tax. The 
authors report provides in-depth speculation about the utility of a federal tax and 
possibilities of revenue generation. The report fails to solve banking issues relating to the 
cannabis industry, however, and does not address laws in place that make the placement 
of cannabis revenue into the banking system illegal.66 “The Economics of the Drug War: 
Effective Federal Policy of Missed Opportunity?”67 covers revenue possibilities as well. 
However, the author does not address organized crime and issues related to the regulation 
of cannabis. Rather, it covers potential tax revenue generation estimates if all drugs were 
legalized. 
These works identify a uniform trend across different localities in the United 
States where cannabis is decriminalized. Federal, state, and local authorities no longer 
pay attention to cannabis from an enforcement perspective and opt to focus solely on 
regulating the industry. The potential for exploitation by DTOs has not been extensively 
examined. If angles exist to exploit the system, DTOs will find the gap and take 
advantage of it. Analysis of Denver and Seattle’s police crime reporting, combined with 
comparative analysis of the FBI’s UCR reporting from 2012 to 2015, should demonstrate 
DTO crime migration patterns, however.  
Having reviewed a substantial volume of available literature, it is evident 
cannabis legalization is a contentious issue that is gaining steady support from an 
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expanding number of areas in the United States. Several gaps appear in the information 
as well. Primarily, no bodies of literature extensively identify the key components of 
cannabis regulation that could be leveraged into a workable legal and institutional 
approach in a national cannabis legalization framework. Moreover, research is lacking 
that reveals how crime is responding to this trend across state lines, and at regional, state, 
and local levels. While this chapter covers the recent field of study, the next chapter 
provides the historical background of cannabis leading up to its widespread acceptance 
today.  
Beginning with the historical context of cannabis and its use in ancient China, the 
next chapter elaborates on how cannabis became illegal via international drug control at 
the United Nations in the early 1900s. Expanding from international drug control, 
gradually the United States became prohibitionist in its approaches to the drug, which 
resulted in criminalization and the inclusion of cannabis as part of the United States’ war 
on drugs. The chapter concludes by expounding on recent trends and acceptance of 
cannabis as a medical treatment and recreational drug. 
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III. A SUMMARY OF CANNABIS USE IN THE UNITED STATES: 
HOW IT ARRIVED WHERE IT IS TODAY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter covers the historical background of cannabis leading up to its current 
status. Many have an understanding of the drug solely based on its scheduling within the 
CSA without considering any historical context. The aim of this chapter is to provide this 
context as a basis for understanding how this drug and the culture surrounding about how 
it arrived where it is today. 
B. HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
Cannabis is a plant that has been used by humans for thousands of years. The 
plant has primarily been used for three purposes: manufacture of hemp cloth, medicine, 
and recreational drug use. Cannabis, also known by its scientific name Cannabis sativa, 
has its early roots recorded as far back as 2737 B.C. under Chinese Emperor Shen Nung, 
the Father of Chinese Medicine and acupuncture.68 Originally used as a medicine, the 
drug expanded in use and popularity to India (1500 B.C.), the Middle East (900 B.C.), 
Europe (800 B.C.), Southeast Asia (100 A.D.), Africa (1000 A.D.), and finally, to the 
Americas (1800 A.D.).69 
As cannabis use increased throughout the world, so did other drugs. Opium, for 
example, was such a prevalent drug throughout the world, widespread propensity for 
abuse lead to initial global drug control efforts. In 1912, the Hague Convention 
established a coordinated international effort to control the import and export of opium. 
Following the Treaty of Versailles around 1919, the League of Nations was established to 
enforce and administer the Hague Convention of 1912. The League of Nations created 
the Opium Advisory Committee (OAC) to provide oversight of this effort, and thus, 
international drug control was born.  
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C. INTERNATIONAL DRUG CONTROL 
Following several years of implementation of new global drug controls and the 
admission of 67 countries to the convention, a significant increase from the original 10, 
the 1925 Convention was held during which cannabis, or its derivatives, was added to the 
list of internationally controlled substances. The addition of cannabis as a controlled 
substance was in response to political pressure from the head of the Egyptian delegation, 
Dr. Mohammed Abdel Salam El Guindy, who classified cannabis as “at least as harmful 
as opium, if not more so.”70 Following a subcommittee meeting, a unanimous decision 
was made to prohibit the exportation to countries where it was illegal, as well as require 
an importation certificate for countries that allowed its use.71  
The treaty effectively banned cannabis on the world stage, which set the 
foundation for a top-down government approach to ban the drug further domestically. 
Between 1915 and 1930, only four of the then 48 states in the United States enacted 
prohibitions against non-medical cannabis. Following additional drug control 
conferences, such as the Conference for the Suppression of Illicit Traffic in Dangerous 
Drugs in Geneva in 1936, national, state and local governments took legislative action to 
ban the substance. Following this convention, 46 of 48 states in the United States adopted 
laws that banned the drug.72  
The contentious issues that dominated the political landscape at the time became a 
focus on whether cannabis actually served a medical purpose, and the approach to the use 
of the drug was becoming increasing intolerant, especially recreationally. Following 
World War II, the United States was extremely influential in world affairs, and as a result 
of the prohibitionist approach of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN), it appeared the 
United States would attempt to outlaw cannabis altogether, citing that less harmful drugs 
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could be used for medical treatments, while recreational use was completely 
unacceptable.73  
During the 1961 Single Convention, and in line with the U.S. approach to 
controlling the drug, the United Nations designated cannabis as containing the most 
dangerous and addictive substances that produce the most harm to humans.74 Effectively, 
50 years of effort culminated in the abolition of cannabis as an acceptable medical or 
recreational drug, and aligned it with cocaine and morphine in terms of the potential harm 
it could cause users. 
International drug control policy is established through the cooperation from 
participating countries within the United Nations via the United Nations Office on Drugs 
and Crime (UNODC). Since 1960, a variety of international drug control mechanisms has 
been established by the UNODC. The UNODC primarily bases its operations on the 
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961, as amended by the 1972 Protocol, the 
Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 1971, and the United Nations Convention 
against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988.75  
Within each of these internationally agreed upon drug control strategies, the focus 
on cannabis as a hard drug, comparable in terms of harmfulness to heroin or cocaine, has 
graduated to more stringent control over time. The 1961 Convention established control 
over the cultivation of the cannabis plant. However, it also allowed a 25-year window to 
comply with controls as they pertain to the use of cannabis for anything other than 
medical or scientific purposes.76 
As time passed and subsequent rules were established via UNODC conventions, 
the international approach took a more hardline approach. In 1986, the 25-year 
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compliance window expired and during the United Nations Convention against Illicit 
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988, signatory countries 
agreed to take measures to prevent the illicit cultivation and eradicate all plants 
containing psychotropic substances, such as cannabis.77 As evidenced in the United 
States, the trajectory of drug enforcement became more stringent toward all drugs 
between the 1961 Convention and today with the war on drugs. In 1971, President Nixon 
asserted this war by stating at a press conference that drug abuse was public enemy 
number one.78  
D. THE WAR ON DRUGS AND DECRIMINALIZATION  
Notwithstanding the war on drugs, several states took matters into their own 
hands as far as decriminalizing cannabis use. Oregon passed legislation to decriminalize 
cannabis possession in 1973, and was the first state to do so, followed by California and 
Alaska in 1975.79 Many states followed this lead throughout the remainder of the 1970s 
and 1980s, and made the possession of small amounts of cannabis a low priority to law 
enforcement agencies. The disparity in approach to cannabis enforcement was so vast, 
toward the end of the Carter administration, the president sought to allow anyone over 21 
to possess up to one ounce of cannabis legally, along with funding for treatment 
programs for addicts.80  
E. DRUG TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATIONS 
The Reagan administration reinvigorated the war on drugs, however, especially as 
it pertained to cannabis enforcement with the focus of enforcement placed on 
transnational criminal organizations (TCOs). In November 1984, the Drug Enforcement 
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Agency (DEA) and Mexican law enforcement officers raided one of the largest cannabis 
plantations ever discovered in Chihuahua, Mexico. The plantation was owned by Rafael 
Quintero and netted approximately 10,000 tons of cannabis, worth $2.5 billion.81  
This raid is only one example of the focus of drug enforcement; however, it 
speaks to the outward concentration on cannabis enforcement at the time. Within the 
United States, efforts were continued to decriminalize cannabis for medical use, or in 
small personal-use amounts, yet between 1990 and 2002, 82% of the national increase in 
drug arrests were for cannabis-related offenses, with virtually all of those for possession, 
which resulted in the expenditure of about $4 billion per year dedicated to minor offenses 
that were either dismissed or adjudicated as a misdemeanor.82 It would be expected that a 
substantial impact had been made to degrade the capacities of DTOs; however, quite the 
opposite has been demonstrated since embarking on the drug war. 
The war on drugs was on a steady course through the 1990s. With the focus of the 
drug war on major TCOs, the domestic enforcement focus on cannabis also steadily 
intensified. Between 1990 and 2002, the arrest frequency for cannabis possession 
increased 113%, which coincided with decreased costs, increased THC levels, as well as 
use and availability.83 Alongside this trend, a spate of state ballot initiatives or legislative 
actions gained approval for the administration of medical cannabis programs. On the 
heels of California’s Compassionate Use Act of 1996, municipalities, as well as state 
governments, adjusted laws to incorporate medical cannabis as a legal means of treating 
common ailments, and thereby, affirming the legal use of medical cannabis in the eyes of 
the corresponding level of government.84  
Proximity to the United States means Mexico exerts primary control over drug 
distribution in the United States. For over a century, Mexico has been home to DTOs 
catering to the United States, and exacerbated by a high level of corruption resulting from 
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profits while continued illegality enhances this effect further.85 Over time, and with the 
fluctuation of drug enforcement, demand for illicit drugs has increased and caused the 
valuation of illicit drugs to increase proportionately, and thereby, profitability to DTOs 
also increased.  
The DOJ, National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC) and DEA assert nine drug 
trafficking organizations control the entire illicit drug trafficking business in Mexico 
(Sinaloa Cartel, Los Zetas, Gulf Cartel, Juarez Cartel, Beltran Leyva Organization, La 
Familia Michoacana, and the Tijuana Cartel).86 In 2015, however, Stratfor analysis 
indicated at least 14 major DTO’s are servicing the southwest border of the United States, 
all of whom traffic in cannabis, and that number is increasing as larger organizations 
balkanize.87 
As with DTOs from Mexico, most organizations diversify their operations and 
become poly-crime businesses. In Mexico, DTOs have been forced to become more 
resilient through a variety of methods. One of the prominent methods is through 
diversifying their illicit activities. DTOs are now engaged in a hodgepodge of 
kidnapping, assassination for hire, auto theft, prostitution, extortion, money laundering, 
software piracy, resource theft, and human smuggling.88 Diversification suggests that the 
organizations are adapting their business models to accommodate slowdowns in various 
areas of activity, such as a decreased demand for cannabis in the United States. 
For now, cannabis still remains the most commonly used illicit drug in the United 
States, however. In 2013, the Congressional Research Service estimated that 19.8 million 
people in the United States aged 12 or older had used cannabis in the last month.89 
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Primarily, Mexican DTOs are meeting such high demand. As Figure 1 demonstrates, the 
majority of the flow of black market cannabis comes from Mexico and makes its way 
across the United States. This figure does not account for legalization in Colorado and 
Washington, however, and raises the question of how the trafficking flow illustrated in 
Figure 1 will be affected. 
Figure 1.  Flow of Illicit Cannabis in the United States, 2008 to 2010 
 
Source: National Drug Intelligence Center, National Drug Threat Assessment: 2011 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/ndic/pubs 
44/44849/44849p.pdf. 
1. Competition from Licit Cannabis 
Cannabis legalization in the United States creates competition for DTOs. The 
wholesale values for cannabis in the United States vary from $1,100 to $13,000 per 
kilogram, depending on quality, while the street value of crystal methamphetamine 
ranges from $19,720 to $87,717 per kilogram.90 This value implies that distributing other 
drugs is a much more profitable business for DTO’s. Introducing legal, high-quality 
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cannabis managed by state governments creates competition and cuts into the 
profitability of black-market cannabis. However, it also hints that states where cannabis is 
illegal will see more prevalent cannabis activity from DTOs attempting to hedge lost 
revenue. The DOJ has recognized this loss of revenue as a factor in cannabis markets. In 
response to both medical and recreational cannabis legalization, the department issued 
prosecutorial guidance for their U.S. attorneys in dealing with cannabis enforcement 
issues nationwide.  
2. Ogden and Cole Memos 
In 2009, Deputy U.S. Attorney General David Ogden issued guidance to help 
focus federal investigations and prosecutions in states where medical cannabis laws were 
enacted.91 As medical cannabis was becoming more widely accepted during this 
timeframe, the Obama administration sought to reign in sporadic law enforcement efforts 
in favor of a unified approach. This guidance was issued to prosecutors in an effort to 
reserve finite federal resources so they could be directed to more pressing federal 
priorities. Under this guidance, prosecution priorities include unlawful possession or 
unlawful use of firearms, violence, and sales to minors.92 “Financial and marketing 
activities inconsistent with the terms of state law, including evidence of money 
laundering activity and/or financial gains or excessive amounts of cash inconsistent with 
the purported compliance with state or local law” also rise as a prosecution priority.93 
The DOJ additionally targets “amounts of marijuana inconsistent with purported 
compliance with state or local law, illegal possession or sale of other controlled 
substances, or ties to other criminal enterprises” under this guidance.94 
The Ogden Memo, as it has become known, cleared the path for federal 
acceptance of medical cannabis. Despite guidance that includes “no state can authorize 
violations of federal law” and “nothing herein precludes investigation or prosecution,” 
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this memo fundamentally initiated an era in which federal authorities would not enforce 
the CSA when it applied to medical cannabis. Effectively, criminal and regulatory 
enforcement burden was shifted to individual states.  
In 2013, in similar fashion to the Ogden Memo, Deputy Attorney General James 
Cole issued guidance regarding cannabis enforcement. This guidance followed the 
legalization of possession of small quantities of cannabis in some states. Prosecutorial 
guidance also changed during this timeframe to focus more on “preventing the 
distribution of cannabis to minors, preventing revenue from the sale of cannabis from 
going to criminal enterprises, gangs, and cartels, and preventing the diversion of 
marijuana from states where it is legal under state law in some form to other states.”95 In 
addition to this guidance, the Cole Memo also prevented “state-authorized cannabis 
activity from being used as a cover or pretext for the trafficking of other illegal drugs or 
other illegal activity, prevented violence and the use of firearms in the cultivation and 
distribution of cannabis, and prevented drugged driving and the exacerbation of other 
adverse public health consequences associated with marijuana use.”96 Finally, the memo 
focused on “preventing the growing of cannabis on public lands and the attendant public 
safety and environmental dangers posed by cannabis production on public lands, and 
preventing cannabis possession or use on federal property.”97 
The Cole Memo was meant to guide federal prosecution guidelines after 
recreational cannabis was legalized in Washington and Colorado. The Cole Memo 
guidelines established a safe haven in both states in which the legal cannabis industry 
could establish itself and operate without fear of criminal prosecution under the CSA. 
U.S. attorneys in all states received this guidance, and in the event additional states 
follow on with legal cannabis, they will also be able to operate with impunity from 
federal prosecution.  
                                                 
95 Cole, Memorandum for All United States Attorneys, Guidance Regarding Marijuana Enforcement, 
1–2. 
96 Ibid., 2. 
97 Ibid. 
 38 
State ballot initiatives opened the door to cannabis legalization in the medical or 
recreational lanes; giving the appearance the federal government was turning a blind eye 
to the trend. In fact, as previously indicated, the federal government set some very 
defined guidelines from which states could draw on to formulate their municipal and state 
regulatory infrastructures. In effect, by releasing the enforcement burden to the states, the 
federal government established the ground rules for this enforcement to occur.  
Accordingly, Colorado and Washington, the first two states to legalize cannabis 
for recreational use, have established robust regulatory systems that use the Ogden and 
Cole memos as their foundations. In Chapter V, Colorado and Washington states’ 
regulatory structures are discussed at length.  
F. SUMMARY 
History demonstrates attitudes toward cannabis have been and will continue to be 
contentious at best. It is logical that voter driven ballot initiatives are the driving force 
behind cannabis legalization in the United States because it is the most used drug in the 
country. It also stands to reason that despite the popularity of the drug and its rapidly 
growing footprint in the United States, many considerations have yet to be studied. 
Associated health issues are long-term questions that will take years to consider. In the 
short-term, implementing effective regulation and anticipating the strategies of criminal 
organizations, in light of cannabis legalization, are of great importance. Through effective 
regulation, cannabis black markets can be outcompeted by government in legal cannabis 
areas. Additionally, DTO response activity can be studied to provide an opportunity to 
align government resources where they are needed.  
The next chapter provides an explanation of the data used for this thesis. As a 
means of assessing the advantages and disadvantages of cannabis legalization in 
Colorado and Washington, data is primarily comprised of regulatory laws, financial data, 
and criminal statistics.  
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IV. RESEARCH DATA 
A. INTRODUCTION  
The cannabis legalization debate has been ongoing for many years. Both sides of 
the debate pose valid arguments for and against legalization. As a result of the 
diametrically opposed positions, the manner in which the United States approaches the 
drug has resulted in a patchwork of acceptance and legality geographically. With 
Colorado and Washington already operating fully legal cannabis industries, and Alaska 
and Oregon in the process of establishing regulatory mechanisms to manage the new 
industry, a great opportunity exists to substantiate claims on both sides. Ultimately, the 
take-away should be evolving drug policy. Both sides of the cannabis legalization debate 
dispute matters associated with regulation, health, taxation, banking, crime, and the 
economy. Accordingly, this thesis examines the advantages and disadvantages of 
cannabis legalization since 2012 in Colorado and Washington in three areas. Those areas 
are regulation, finance, and crime. Each area is addressed individually in the next three 
sections.  
B. REGULATORY SYSTEM DATA  
Colorado and Washington have regulatory systems designed to manage a 
commercial industry. The emergence of these types of infrastructures in both states has 
likely been driven by the need to adhere to the same federal laws, as well as the U.S. 
Constitution.98 Information gleaned from the Colorado Marijuana Enforcement Division 
(MED), as well as the Washington State Liquor and Marijuana Control Board (LMCB), 
indicates both states have implemented regulatory infrastructures similar to those used to 
regulate alcoholic beverages.99 The comparative information in the Appendix is derived 
from Colorado MED and Washington LMCB regulations, and it highlights key aspects 
                                                 
98 Pardo, “Cannabis Policy Reforms in the Americas: A Comparative Analysis of Colorado, 
Washington, and Uruguay,” 733. 
99 “FAQs on I-502,” December 17, 2012, http://lcb.wa.gov/marijuana/faqs_i-502; “Marijuana 
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enforcement. 
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including taxation, licensing, possession/use, and other requirements within the states. 
The advantages and disadvantages of these regulatory systems are discussed at length in 
Chapter V.  
C. FISCAL AND ECONOMIC DATA 
This section addresses fiscal and economic data surrounding the cannabis industry 
in Colorado and Washington. The first section specifically addresses data holdings 
specific to tax revenues within the states. In the second section, other economic indicator 
data, such as travel, employment, and real estate, are the focus.  
1. State Tax Revenue Reporting 
The Colorado Department of Revenue maintains hearty cannabis tax revenue 
reporting.100 Official tax revenue reporting collected for the state includes sales, 
licensing, and excise tax revenue data for both medical and recreational cannabis. This 
data has been maintained since the introduction of recreational cannabis in Colorado in 
January 2014 and spans to the most recent available reporting in October 2015. Similar to 
Colorado, Washington also maintains its own tax accounting mechanisms.  
The Washington State Liquor and Cannabis Board (WLCB) maintains tax 
revenue and total sale data for both medical and recreational cannabis.101 The data 
reviewed for this thesis represents monthly total sales, licensing, and tax collections from 
Washington fiscal years 2014 to November 2015, which represents the total duration 
recreational cannabis has been legal in the state. 
2. Other Economic Indicators  
In addition to state tax revenue data, other economic indicators have been 
included as advantages and disadvantages of cannabis legalization in Colorado and 
Washington. Travel trends in Colorado have been examined extensively for the state 
                                                 
100 “Colorado Marijuana Tax Data,” accessed December 12, 2015, https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/ 
revenue/colorado-marijuana-tax-data. 
101 “Frequently Requested Lists,” August 2, 2011, http://www.liq.wa.gov/records/frequently-request 
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government to help assess the travel industry within the state. Accordingly, this thesis 
includes travel data from the “Colorado Travel Impacts 1996 to 2014” report by Dean 
Runyan and Associates.102 
Real estate and employment figures play important roles in assessing the viability 
of the economy. Commercial real estate company CBRE Group provides real estate 
market analysis for the greater Denver, Colorado area.103 While residential analysis as it 
pertains to the cannabis industry is difficult to locate, the company conducted an analysis 
of how industrial real estate has been impacted by the cannabis industry in Denver. Data 
from this report is included in this thesis. In terms of employment data, The Colorado 
MED provides an annual update on the status of marijuana enforcement in the state. As 
the state requires background checks and collection of data about the employees in the 
cannabis industry, this report contains relevant data concerning employment figures. This 
data is analyzed to assess further employment figures directly related to the cannabis 
industry. 
D. CRIME DATA  
The FBI’s UCR was originally established in 1929 by the International 
Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) to meet the “need for reliable uniform crime 
statistics for the nation.”104 Today, the FBI maintains the program and it houses multiple 
reports, produced from the statistical holdings of more than 18,000 law enforcement 
agencies.105 Crime data collected in support of this thesis is derived from reporting in 
three areas of the FBI’s UCR: drug arrests, violent crime, and property crime. Each area 
measures these crimes in Colorado and Washington and compares the data against 
national averages in the same categories and the duration measured includes years 2012, 
2013, and 2014.  
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As an additional means of data validation, the UCR data analysis is compared to 
the same data maintained by the two largest city police departments in Colorado and 
Washington, the Seattle and Denver police departments. This extra level of comparison is 
being completed to corroborate any of the findings of the analysis at the state level, given 
that findings should be exaggerated within these cities as a result of the high 
concentration of cannabis industry activity in these locations. In other words, if 
identifiable trends in crime at the state level occur, an exaggerated level of the same trend 
in these cities should happen as a result of the higher level of cannabis commerce 
occurring there. Each of the next sections further highlights the elements of the crime 
data being analyzed. 
1. Regional Drug Arrest Activity 
The drug arrest activity reporting represents the percentage of distribution of 
arrests for drug abuse violations by region. State level data is not available. Drug abuse 
violations are divided into two categories, namely sale/manufacturing and possession. In 
addition, the violations further breakdown into drug types. Washington and Colorado are 
both located in the west region for the purposes of this data. An additional 10 states are 
also included in this region.  
2. Violent Crime  
Violent crime data addresses the individual states of Colorado and Washington. 
According to the FBI’s UCR, violent crime is defined as murder and non-negligent 
manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault.106 Violent crimes are 
defined as such because they involve force or threat of force. The data further separates 
minors from the total arrest numbers, and provides the total population for the state. 
3. Property Crime 
Property crime data addresses the states of Colorado and Washington. According 
to the FBI’s UCR, property crime is defined as burglary, larceny, theft, motor vehicle 
                                                 
106 “Violent Crime,” accessed December 12, 2015, https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-
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theft, and arson: “The object of the theft-type offenses is the taking of money or property, 
but force or the threat of force is not used against the victims.”107 The data further 
separates minors from the total arrest numbers, and provides the total population for the 
state. 
4. City-Level Crime 
The highest concentration of dispensed legal cannabis occurs in the largest cities 
in Colorado and Washington. As such, it is important to analyze crime levels in these 
cities as the industry is most firmly rooted in these locations and the crime statistics are 
more representative of the effect legalized cannabis has on a locality. Crime statistical 
data includes information from 2012 to 2015 from Denver, Colorado and Seattle, 
Washington. 
E. SUMMARY 
The data collected for this thesis focuses on the most impacted areas of the actual 
legalization debate. The introduction in Chapter I clearly identifies some of the more 
prominent debate points from both sides of the legalization discussion. The majority of 
these points, with the exception of health, can be categorized under regulation, finance, or 
crime. The next chapter reviews data specific to Colorado and Washington before and 
after legalization to identify advantages and disadvantages legalization in both states. The 
findings refute or substantiate points on both sides of the debate and as an output, policy 
recommendations are made to improve identified disadvantages.  
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V. RESEARCH RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide analysis and discussion of the data from 
Chapter IV. This data addresses three areas relating to cannabis regulation, finance, and 
crime in the states of Colorado and Washington. This chapter is divided into two sections 
entitled substantial advantages of cannabis and substantial disadvantages of cannabis to 
cover both sides of the debate. Each of these sections addresses key data points in 
subsections from cannabis regulation, finance, and crime data in greater detail. 
B. SUBSTANTIAL ADVANTAGES OF CANNABIS 
This section is comprised of three sections that address solely the advantages of 
legalizing cannabis, as derived from regulatory, financial, and criminal data holdings 
associated with Colorado and Washington. Some distinctive and unanticipated 
advantages to legalization have resulted within these states and the following sections 
address these advantages.  
1. Cannabis Regulation 
This section examines the positive aspects of the cannabis regulatory structures in 
Colorado and Washington. The first two states to legalize recreational cannabis have 
established for-profit commercial industry models of cannabis regulation, controlled by 
their own state agencies. With respect to the major components of the regulatory 
infrastructures, both are very similar in that they tax at cannabis production and sale 
points, control sale and possession amounts, marketing, and product labeling. The 
systems also implement criminal background check requirements for employees working 
in the industry, as well as track actual plants during their growth from what is known as 
seed to sale plant tracking. The Colorado MED and the Washington State LMCB are both 
derived from state liquor regulatory agencies.108 As such, both state agencies have the 
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experience of addressing the regulation of alcohol and leveraging this experience into 
their cannabis regulatory methodologies.  
While both states have implemented a regulatory system similar to alcoholic 
beverage controls, a significant advantage for both states relies on their geographic 
location with relation to other prohibitionist states. Colorado and Washington are 
surrounded by prohibitionist states, or at least decriminalized, states. Proximity to these 
other states lends to the notion that not only will Colorado and Washington benefit from 
the population from their states in terms of cannabis sales, but they will also cater to the 
cannabis consumers of other prohibitionist states. An unintended benefit of the 
commercial system is the draw of consumers from other states, which means not only are 
cannabis-legal states deriving revenue from their own populations, but they are also 
bringing in revenue from neighboring states where the drug is prohibited.  
Thus, the commercial model regulatory systems of Colorado and Washington 
invariably have an impact on the cannabis markets of prohibitionist states, as well as their 
own. In Colorado, for example, the state estimates nearly 50% of the recreational sales of 
cannabis in Denver consist of out-of-state sales, while out-of-state consumers make up 
90% of sales in mountain resort communities.109 This information highlights that a 
significant portion of consumers come from other areas, presumably prohibitionist states. 
Colorado and Washington do not track where consumers reside; therefore, defining 
where out-of-state consumers are from on a widespread level is a limitation. The fact 
remains that the bulk of recreational sales in Colorado are made to consumers from other 
states, and that citizens from prohibitionist states represent a significant market for sales 
of legal cannabis. These sales favor the displacement of black markets even in 
prohibitionist states, and as a result of improvements made to quality control cannabis 
production in cannabis legal states; this effect will continue to evolve. 
Cannabis consumers will patronize markets where they obtain the highest quality 
product at the lowest cost. Markets in Washington and Colorado are profit motivated, so 
                                                 




in both locations, quality is a priority. In Colorado, for example, “Colorado Marijuana 
Study Finds Legal Weed Contains Potent THC Levels,” found that typical cannabis from 
the pre-2000s era contained about 10% THC, whereas current levels average 18.7%, and 
in many instances, reaches 30%.110 This factor bodes well for the licit market in that the 
most potent cannabis on the planet is grown in the legal systems in Colorado and 
Washington. In terms of quality control, the regulatory systems in Colorado and 
Washington will continue to attract consumers who seek high quality cannabis, even 
those from outside their states.  
Legal and regulatory disparity among states, and a lack of a rational cannabis 
strategy at the national level, creates a licit business opportunity. Legalizing cannabis in 
select states opens the door for them to establish legal markets that cater to everyone, 
regardless of state boundaries. It is significant in that it appears a large portion of 
consumers come from prohibitionist states. Therefore, cannabis-legal states are 
capitalizing on regulatory and legal disparity. Coupled with a lack of an enforced national 
policy on the matter, and high demand in prohibitionist states, states early to legalize will 
be in a position to gain the most fiscally. This factor will hold true at least as long as 
other states continue to be prohibitionist. The next section addresses the financial benefits 
of cannabis in fully legal states.  
2. Financial Implications 
As previously underscored, cannabis-legal states tap into a substantial level of 
demand for the substance. Historically, as a result of the war on drugs approach to the 
drug, demand was met by DTOs and other criminal organizations. Today, as a result of 
state operated distribution of cannabis, a supply shift has occurred from these criminal 
organizations, to legitimate government regulatory agencies and the private sector. The 
states and private sector have benefited from legal cannabis by replacing criminal 
organizations.  
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In Figure 2, the benefit of operating a high-demand business that has transitioned 
from an illegal status to a legal status is demonstrated. In just under two years, the 
commercial cannabis industry in Colorado has gone from generating $3.51 million 
(January 2014) in taxes, licenses, and fees per month to $13.2 million (August 2015).111 
As Figure 2 demonstrates, between August and October 2015, revenues in this category 
decreased from $13.2 million to $11.3 million.112 For the period measured, revenues 
have averaged $8.4 million a month, with an average monthly increase in revenues of 
$370,012.113 These figures suggest legal cannabis markets continue to grow and absorb 
what has historically been a black market business not just in state, but from 
prohibitionist states as well. 
Figure 2.  Colorado Tax Revenue by Month since Inception of Recreational 
Cannabis Legalization 
 
Source: “Colorado Marijuana Tax Data,” accessed December 12, 2015, https://www. 
colorado.gov/pacific/revenue/colorado-marijuana-tax-data. 
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As previously underlined, cannabis tax revenues in the state of Colorado, since 
the inception of recreational cannabis, demonstrate a paradigm shift from what has 
historically been a black-market commodity to a legitimate business. Aside from tax and 
private sector sales, which are well accounted for by the state, some notable economic 
benefits have also been realized in Colorado. All-encompassing data available in this area 
is not as reliable as tax income figures maintained by the state because no single source is 
tracking this information. However, sporadic entities do account for cannabis economic 
stimulus, as the next paragraph highlights.  
As a result of a private sector regulated by the state, Colorado’s cannabis industry 
has not only drawn tax revenues for the state, but it has also helped generate economic 
stimulus in the form of job creation, real estate value increase, and tourism. According to 
“Colorado Travel Impacts 1996 to 2014,” “the Colorado travel industry experienced a 
7.4% increase in spending from 2013 in current dollars, and when adjusted for price 
changes, the increase in travel spending for Colorado was approximately 6.5%.”114 
Although it is difficult to ascertain if residential real estate has been directly impacted by 
legalization, CBRE, the largest commercial real estate company servicing Denver, 
indicates between 2009 and 2014, cannabis cultivation companies have increased 
occupancy to more than a third of the industrial space leased in Denver.115 In terms of 
job creation, in December 2014, 15,992 people were licensed to work in the state’s 
cannabis industry as compared to 6,593 at the beginning of 2014, which equates to an 
increase of 143% in one year.116  
This data is significant because it reflects advantages of legal cannabis in 
Colorado not only impact tax and sale revenue figures, but also that other areas, such as 
real estate, employment, and travel sectors, benefit. These areas have realized advantages 
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of legalized cannabis via second-hand economic stimulus. Although an increase in travel 
to Colorado has not been firmly linked as being caused by cannabis legalization, the 
increase correlates to data indicating a vast amount of cannabis sales are made to out-of-
state residents. As a corollary, a 6% increase in inbound domestic flights to Colorado 
from 2013 was noted, and this increase is consistent with yearly increases since 2009, the 
year medical cannabis was legalized in Colorado.117  
Data from Colorado demonstrates significant financial windfalls in the areas of 
tax, sales, real estate, employment, and travel increases. Washington state data also 
follows a similar trajectory as illustrated in Figures 3 and 4. During the 18 months for 
which statistics are available, the average revenue intake a month for Washington was 
$7,271,118, and the average increase per month in revenues for the state was 
$770,382.118 Despite operating their legal market for six months less than Colorado, 
Washington has more than doubled its monthly increase in tax revenues as compared to 
Colorado, which could be explained by any number of factors, including population 
growth. For example, between 2012 and 2015, Washington experienced a population 
growth of 25.5%, while Colorado experienced a growth rate of 10.5%.119 This rate of 
population growth could help to explain why Washington has an average monthly tax 
revenue increase about twice the size of Colorado’s. However, the tax rates in both 
locations also differ in rate with Washington collecting approximately 10% more 
cannabis tax than Colorado. 
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Figure 3.  FY14 Washington Tax Revenues by Month 
 




Figure 4.  FY15 Washington Tax Revenues by Month 
 
Adapted from “Frequently Requested Lists,” August 2, 2011, http://www.liq.wa.gov/records/frequently-requested-lists. 
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Figures 2–4 are significant when compared. They demonstrate that in September/
October 2015, revenues in both Washington and Colorado plateaued and even slightly 
decreased for the first time since legalization. This data suggests that the legal markets 
may have reached capacity within their respective territories. In short, the finite number 
of cannabis users who used to partake in black markets in both states may have 
completely transitioned to legal markets. In this case, that population of consumers will 
not increase; therefore, the level of revenue generated by private and public sectors will 
plateau or decrease. Additional analysis over time is needed to assess the volume of this 
market properly; however, at a certain point, the expectation is that market demand will 
be satisfied and revenues will not increase as substantially as they have been as the 
market’s capacity is reached.  
From a fiscal perspective, it is difficult to argue against cannabis legalization, at 
least within individual states. In both states where cannabis is fully legal, an enormous 
stream of revenue for the state, as well as the private sector, has been created. As a 
secondary benefit, other sectors such as employment, real estate, and travel have been 
positively impacted. This impact leads to the assertion that revenue for this high demand 
product is not only being drawn from within the state, but also from outside the state. The 
ubiquitous nature of drug trafficking leaves a fair amount of speculation in terms of lost 
market share to DTOs and other criminal organizations, but it is fair to assess that 100% 
of the revenue currently within the legal systems in Colorado and Washington have been 
taken from formerly black markets.  
Considering these positive fiscal aspects, the next section deliberates positive 
impacts legalization has had on crime in cannabis-legal areas.  
3. Crime 
This thesis assessed crime factors in Colorado and Washington before and after 
cannabis was legalized for recreational sale and this section addresses the matter more 
extensively. The most advantageous factors relating to crime for cannabis legal states 
have been that cannabis offenses have significantly decreased, legal cannabis has drawn 
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consumers from the black market, and DTOs are hedging their cannabis losses into other 
drugs and crime.  
The most prominent, and logical, advantage of cannabis legalization was the 
decrease in cannabis-related crimes. In Washington, for example, after the first year of 
fully legalized cannabis, court filings decreased 98% for low-level cannabis offenses by 
adults 21 years of age and older.120 More significantly, between 2000 and 2010, 
Washington spent over $200 million on cannabis enforcement.121 As a result of the 
decrease in low-level cannabis arrests, savings in police and court expenses on this type 
of crime could potentially save millions of dollars for the state.122 Decreasing the costs of 
enforcement of cannabis-related crime is one of the foundations of the pro-cannabis 
debate. Data substantiates this advantage in Colorado and Washington. Furthermore, the 
absence of potentially being arrested for low-level cannabis crimes is an incentive to 
consumers. Unsurprisingly, when an illegal substance is suddenly legal, the expectation is 
that crime in that area will decrease, as the data demonstrates, but continuing concern 
remains over how DTOs will hedge their losses.  
Increased quantity and quality of cannabis products in the legal states of the 
United States supports the idea that the need to smuggle the drug from foreign countries 
like Mexico will continue to dwindle. Legal cannabis is cheaper to produce, in most cases 
grown locally, and more potent than black market cannabis in most cases as well.123 
Evading detection during smuggling does not result in an added benefit. Presumably, 
criminal efforts to decrease production costs to remain competitive in the United States 
will continue to become more difficult as the drug becomes more prevalent in legal 
markets.  
In terms of drug crime, the FBI’s UCR data examined suggests three trends may 
be occurring within cannabis-legal states. First, law enforcement resource excess is being 
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applied to other areas of drug crime effectively, in this case, the other dangerous non-
narcotic drug category from the FBI’s UCR, resulting in more arrests. This trend makes 
sense because the increase in arrests for possession of other dangerous non-narcotic drugs 
has increased 7% between 2012 and 2015, while cannabis possession arrests have 
decreased 5.1% during the same period. 
Secondly, a migration in drug trafficking activity to the other dangerous non-
narcotic drugs category may occur by criminal organizations as a result of their 
presumed loss of market share in black market cannabis. The FBI’s UCR arrest data 
indicates this migration effect is only happening in the region in which cannabis has been 
legalized recreationally, and not throughout the remainder of the United States, which 
may be an indicator of a third trend.124 
The third trend suggests this UCR activity is a combination of both law 
enforcement resource excess and migration of drug crime activity from cannabis to other 
dangerous non-narcotic drugs. Whichever trend may be occurring, the pricing and 
promotion of the legal market appears to have impacted drug crime in the region in which 
both fully cannabis-legal states are located. 
Overall, criminal data supports the argument that cannabis legalization increases 
the capacity of the criminal justice systems by removing the need to address low-level 
cannabis crime. An indicator that cannabis legalization is detracting from black market 
profitability is the notable increase in arrests for other dangerous non-narcotic drugs. 
This trend suggests a hedge of illegal activity from the cannabis market where it is 
becoming increasingly difficult for criminal organizations to remain competitive.  
Fully legalizing cannabis in Colorado and Washington has brought some positive 
benefits to both states. Data supports the argument that the majority of cannabis 
consumers from these states have transitioned from the cannabis black market to the legal 
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markets. In addition to consumers within cannabis-legal states, consumers outside the 
states, presumably in prohibition states, make up a large percentage of the sales within 
the legal systems. Thus, cannabis black markets in prohibition states are also losing 
market share. The transition of consumers to the legal market in both states has generated 
a substantial economic stimulus. Taken in conjunction with the decreased burden on the 
criminal justice systems, both states are in a fiscally advantageous position. However, 
some disadvantages have resulted from cannabis legalization. These effects are 
considered in the next section. 
C. SUBSTANTIAL DISADVANTAGES OF CANNABIS 
Certainly, the advocates of cannabis legalization have lauded the advantageous 
points previously identified. The following sections elaborate on data that point toward 
some of the disadvantages or drawbacks of cannabis legalization. The next section is 
similarly arranged and assesses disadvantages within regulation, finance, and crime as 
they pertain to cannabis legalization in Colorado and Washington.  
1. Cannabis Regulation 
Distinctive advantages of cannabis legalization were previously highlighted, and 
while data supported considerable advantages, some disadvantages can also result. This 
section examines those disadvantages further, starting with the regulatory systems that 
have been implemented in Colorado and Washington. Following an examination of 
regulatory disadvantages, financial and crime factors are considered.  
The commercial model of regulation in Colorado and Washington are profit-
motivated. In these states, the cannabis market is finite. In other words, only so many 
cannabis consumers can exist within the market. Much like any other regulated 
substance, such as alcohol or tobacco, a commercial model of distribution, while 
beneficial in the areas of economic stimulus, relies on a finite amount of users. The 
National Institute on Drug Abuse indicates that cannabis is the most used illicit drug and 
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that 81.0% of illicit drug users in the United States used cannabis in the last 30 days.125 
This data implies that the bulk of cannabis users in Colorado and Washington are habitual 
users; thus, the market primarily caters to this population. Profit motive dictates the 
commercial aspect of the industry is reliant on habitual drug users to maintain 
profitability. The same assessment is also applicable to state governments that rely on this 
population to purchase the drug. Therefore, it is in the best interest of the private sectors 
in these states for frequent use among this population to continue to occur, with the focus 
on increasing profit. Effectively, both states accommodate a trade-off, an increase in 
habitual drug users for revenue under their current systems. An increase in habitual drug 
use among the population is a distinctive disadvantage because it supports the need to 
perpetuate the trend. In Colorado, it appears this trend is already underway in that 
Colorado was ranked third in the nation for current marijuana use among youth aged 12 
to 17 years old.126 This data represents a 56% higher average than the current national 
average and is an increase of 24% since 2009.127  
Despite regulatory efforts in cannabis-legal states to increase youth cannabis drug 
education, label products, and limit sales to minors, it appears more needs to be done in 
this area to decrease the propensity for future use. Data supports that it will be difficult to 
strike a balance between use prevention, treatment efforts, and profit motive in the 
cannabis-legal states.128 
Data supporting this thesis highlights that the focus of cannabis regulatory 
systems is mainly on commerce generation, while curbing current and future cannabis 
use among youth remains an issue. In the next section, financial disadvantages are 
weighed.  
                                                 
125 Nora D. Volkow, “Marijuana,” accessed December 19, 2015, https://d14rmgtrwzf5a.cloudfront. 
net/sites/default/files/mjrrs_9_15.pdf. 
126 Kevin Wong and Chelsey Clarke, 2015 Final Legalization of Marijuana in Colorado The Impact 






2. Financial Implications 
Cannabis-legal states have generated a substantial revenue stream for both the 
industry and respective state governments. It is difficult to argue any disadvantages with 
the system within the states. One significant disadvantage leads to other problems for the 
fledgling industry outside the states, however. That problem is federalism in the banking 
and tax sector.  
As the system is currently established, cannabis businesses cannot legally deposit 
proceeds into the federal banking system because the federal government sees the 
currency as proceeds from an illegal enterprise. The banking categorization is derived 
from federal laws, which are guided by the CSA. In 2013, the U.S. Department of 
Treasury, acting on guidance from the DOJ Cole Memo, enabled limited banking with 
cannabis businesses but the transactions had to be supported by a suspicious activity 
report (SAR) filed by individual banks.129 This requirement does not relieve banks of 
criminal liability, however, and the result has been that most banks approach the venture 
skittishly for fear of being criminally liable or labeled as money launderers. 
Consequently, cannabis businesses operating in legal capacities at the state level have 
limited options in terms of access to banking. It is a significant financial disadvantage 
because the alternative to banking is operating as a cash business. Cash businesses open a 
variety of criminal vulnerabilities from low-level robberies to tax evasion matters. The 
tax issue is a significant disadvantage as well. 
Cannabis businesses pay state taxes, and consequently, must pay federal taxes on 
100% of their gross income.130 Taxes present an issue for cannabis businesses because 
their tax burden is substantially increased. Accordingly, businesses are placed in a 
difficult position by having to choose not to pay federal taxes, and risk criminal liability 
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for tax evasion, or pay them and potentially be forced into non-profitability.131 The 
banking issues combined with tax issues are significant disadvantages for the cannabis 
businesses in cannabis-legal states because both areas touch federal criminality. In this 
case, federalism becomes an encumbrance to the states.  
This section demonstrates the complexity of banking and tax issues between the 
state and federal levels when both entities differ on legality of cannabis. Legal 
interpretation also bears significant weight in terms of how crime is affected by cannabis 
legalization. In similar fashion to banking and taxation, interpretations of criminality in 
different states, and at different levels of government, are a large part of the cannabis 
legalization debate. In the next section, disadvantages of cannabis as they relate to crime 
are considered.  
3. Crime 
One of the main focuses of the cannabis legalization debate is the impact 
legalization has had on crime. Many speculated crime would spin out of control after full 
legalization occurred in Colorado and Washington. Findings reveal this hypothesis not to 
be the case, however. While crime figures before and after full legalization in Colorado 
and Washington did reflect increases in crime, the data paints a different picture than 
what was anticipated by anti-cannabis legalization groups.  
a. UCR Drug Arrest Activity 
The following data is compiled from the FBI’s UCR from the years 2012 to 2014, 
the last year data was available. The reporting represents the percentage of distribution of 
arrests for drug abuse violations by region. Drug abuse violations are divided into two 
categories namely sale/manufacturing and possession. In addition, the violations further 
breakdown into drug types. Colorado and Washington are both located in the west region 
for purposes of this data. 




The FBI’s UCR captures arrest information for drug abuse violations as one 
component of an array of collected data. It breaks down drug abuse violations by four 
regions into two categories, sale/manufacturing and possession. The report further breaks 
down arrest activity by drug type. The following UCR data covers the period of 2012 to 
2014, with 2014 being the most recent year for which the FBI’s UCR collated the 
information.  
During this period, cannabis sale/manufacturing arrests decreased as a total 
percentage of arrests from 0.9% in the west region. In the United States as a whole, this 
figure also decreased from 0.7%. Summarily, cannabis arrests for sale/manufacturing 
decreased in the United States during this period. During the same period, cannabis 
possession arrests also decreased in the west region from 4%. During the same time 
frame, in the United States as a whole, this type of arrest decreased from 2.7%, 
respectively.  
As expected, cannabis arrests in both the west region and throughout the United 
States as a whole decreased. With less emphasis placed on cannabis prosecutions, law 
enforcement should theoretically experience resource excess that might be able to target 
other types of harmful drugs or criminal activity. A correlational expectation would be an 
increase in arrests for other types of drug activity during this period.  
(2) Other Dangerous Drugs  
The FBI’s UCR reveals additional arrest information for other drug types by 
region and nationally. The additional drug types are categorized as heroin/cocaine or 
derivatives, synthetic or manufactured drugs, and other dangerous nonnarcotic drugs.132 
From 2012 to 2014, heroin/cocaine or derivative arrests in both the sale/manufacturing 
and possession categories remained stable regionally and nationally. This trend also held 
true for synthetics. Heroin is a Schedule I drug and cocaine is a Schedule II drug 
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according to the CSA.133 Historically, attitudes toward these drugs have been much more 
negative than they have been toward cannabis, which has resulted in fewer consumers. 
The 2014 National Survey on Drug Use and Health indicates the use of heroin accounted 
for 0.4% of all drug use and cocaine use accounted for 1.5%.134 Similarly, synthetics are 
perceived as more harmful drugs with variable effects with use and are not as prevalent 
as cannabis. Simply put, these drugs are not as common as cannabis, and because of the 
perceived harm they cause, they are a top priority for counterdrug efforts, which may 
explain in part why these statistics remained stable for the period examined.  
Sale/manufacturing of other dangerous nonnarcotic drugs demonstrated stability 
as well. Possession arrests in this drug category, however, demonstrated a national 
increase of 2.8%. Regionally, arrests for possession of other dangerous nonnarcotic drugs 
increased by 7%. The FBI defines the other dangerous nonnarcotic drugs category as 
containing drugs, such as barbiturates and benzedrine.135 This category of drug arrest was 
the only area in which a slight increase occurred. The increase was so slight; it may be 
explainable by factors, such as population increase or another similar factor.  
(3) Denver Drug/Narcotics Violations  
The city of Denver collects information regarding drug and narcotic violations, 
which conform to collection requirements of the Colorado Department of Public Safety; 
however, this information does not further elaborate on drug type.136 During the calendar 
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years of 2012, 2013, and 2014, drug/narcotic violations increased 23.4%, 9.6%, and 
11.9%, respectively.137 
The city of Denver is a major focal point of the cannabis legalization effort. Drug 
and narcotic violations significantly increased in the city during the researched time 
frame. Data supports the assertion that these types of crimes will increase in major cities 
where cannabis is legalized; however, additional time and research is needed to further 
establish if the increase is caused by cannabis legalization. 
It should be noted that the Seattle Police Department does not maintain publicly 
available drug/narcotic arrest data; therefore, further examination of drug crime in the 
city was not conducted.138 This lack of available arrest data is a limiting factor in that 
drug crime increases in Denver could not be compared to Seattle.  
b. Violent and Property Crime 
The following information is compiled from the FBI’s UCR relating to violent 
and property crime for the calendar years 2012 to 2014, the last year for which data was 
available, and covers the states of Colorado and Washington.  
The FBI’s UCR provides violent and property crime rates, by state, according to 
arrests made each year.139 In November 2012, both states voted to legalize cannabis for 
recreational use.140 Concurrently, the steepest increase in violent crime in both states 
occurred in 2013. In Colorado, violent crimes increased 5.9%, while in Washington, 
violent crimes rose 6.9%.141 The national average during the same time period decreased 
7.8%.142 As measured from 2012 to 2014, both states increased in levels of violent crime 
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with Colorado increasing a total of 10.4% and Washington increasing 7%.143 These 
figures are high compared to the national average, which decreased by 4.3%.144 
For the same period, the total property crime arrest rate increased in Colorado 
39.7%. The national average for this period decreased 5.6%. The number of arrests for 
property crimes in Washington also increased 13.5%.145 
This data implies violent and property crime has increased in areas in which 
cannabis legalization occurred, but to establish causation, additional research over time is 
needed as any number of variables may impact crime rates. The FBI identifies a variety 
of factors known to affect crime rates to include population, degree of urbanization, 
variations in population composition, transportation modes, economic conditions, and 
effectiveness of policing.146 
c. City-Level Crime 
The highest concentration of dispensed legal cannabis occurs in the largest cities 
in Colorado and Washington. As such, it is important to analyze crime levels in these 
cities, as the industry is most firmly rooted in these locations and the crime statistics are 
more representative of the effect legalized cannabis has on a locality. Crime statistical 
data includes information from 2012 to 2015 from Denver, Colorado and Seattle, 
Washington. 
The Denver and the Seattle police departments maintain criminal statistics for 
each state’s Department of Public Safety. This data is kept independently of FBI’s UCR 
data. Data from Denver and Seattle, where retail cannabis was legalized in 2013, and 
retail sales commenced in 2014 at some point, can act as an independent data verification 
of criminal statistic trends maintained within the FBI’s UCR.  
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(1) Denver  
The city of Denver enumerates crime by four categories of arrest: crimes against 
persons, crimes against property, crimes against society (drug crimes are counted in this 
category), and all other offenses.147 Data for 2015 is current as of November 1, 2015; 
thusly, data has been projected for the months of November and December based on the 
previous 10 months of collected data. In Denver, between 2012 and 2015, crimes against 
persons increased by 51.6% from 7,255 to 11,001.148 During the same period, crimes 
against property rose from 32,553 to 33,229, an increase of 2.1%.149 Similarly, crimes 
against society increased during the coinciding period from 2,358 to 5,788, representing a 
145.5% increase.150 Arrests for all other offenses during the corresponding time frame 
increased from 2,172 to 14,638.151 Accordingly, a 573.9% increase occurred in all other 
offenses.152 
(2) Seattle  
The Seattle Police Department collects statistics for two crime types for reporting 
purposes. The two types of crime tracked are person crimes and property crimes. Data 
from the years 2012 to 2015 was collected and similar to Denver data. Crime projections 
were estimated for the final two months of 2015 based on the previous 10 months of 
crime data. Between 2012 and 2015, person crime increased from 3,486 to 3,756, an 
increase of 7.7% over four years. Property crime was also evaluated for the same time 
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period, revealing a 13.9% increase over four years from 32,212 to 36,697. These figures 
correspond to the FBI’s UCR reporting for the state.153  
Seattle and Denver both demonstrate crime increases between 2012 and 2015. 
Overall, Seattle revealed a total crime increase of 35,698 incidents in 2012 to 40,453 in 
2015, representing an overall crime rate increase of 13.3%. In Denver, the overall crime 
rate increased from 44,338 incidents in 2012 to 64,657 in 2015. These figures reveal the 
overall crime rate in Denver increased 45.8% during this time frame.  
Criminal data examined for this thesis demonstrates increased crime overall for 
both Colorado and Washington. As the data was cross-examined at the city level, these 
increases were exacerbated. This data lends to the argument that crime has increased in 
response to cannabis legalization; however, causation cannot be firmly established at this 
early stage in the process. This data reflects a correlational relationship only. One area in 
which adverse impacts are being felt as a direct result of cannabis legalization is 
prohibitionist states. The next section addresses this dynamic.  
d. Adverse Impact on Prohibitionist States 
Disparity in cannabis policy across the country creates a significant problem as far 
as diversion is concerned. The proximity of legal states to non-legal states means 
criminals looking to cash in on the diversion of legal cannabis will fuel illegal behavior. 
Disparity boils down to the will of the population in a particular state. Thus, states like 
Colorado and Washington, having seen the fiscal windfalls of cannabis legalization, 
appear to be sold on legalization. It is a significant problem for non-legal states because 
legalization drives illegal activity to locations where cannabis is still illegal and demand 
is high. 
This problem is evident in the nature of the relationships between Colorado and 
surrounding states. As Colorado enjoys the economic stimulus of legalizing a controlled 
substance, surrounding states have to contend with legal Colorado cannabis diversion. 
The Rocky Mountain High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (RMHIDTA) estimates a 
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592% increase in interdiction seizures of Colorado cannabis destined for other states 
when comparing the 2005–2008 with 2014; the year cannabis was fully legalized.154 In 
other words, the burden of enforcement relinquished by the DOJ and placed on individual 
states, is not being maintained by those states. Nearby states that never signed on for 
added burden now have inadvertently taken on the additional cost for enforcement 
responsibilities not being enforced in cannabis-legal states.  
Proximity between states seems not to be a factor. Certainly, states that are farther 
from legalized states seem to be a focal point for the trafficking of legal cannabis 
presumably because the sale price increases the farther from legalized states a person 
travels. RMHIDTA highlights that 360 seizures (in highway traffic stops only) occurred 
in 2014, and it was subsequently determined that 36 different states were the intended 
recipients of cannabis from Colorado, with Missouri, Illinois, Oklahoma, and Florida 
topping of the list.155 In addition to trafficking by vehicle, the postal service has been a 
popular venue for drug trafficking. An indicator of this smuggling vector is evident in the 
2,033% increase in mail parcel interdictions between 2010 and 2014.156  
Consequently, as states legalize cannabis, this data supports the argument that 
those states become source states for the distribution of cannabis. As highlighted, it is not 
a problem when prohibitionist populations enter cannabis-legal states to consume 
cannabis. The problem arises when trafficking to prohibitionist states occurs. Principally, 
cannabis-legal states violate components of the DOJ Cole and Ogden memos; namely, 
the prohibition of interstate trafficking, and unfortunately, prohibitionist states must 
contend with the problem.  
D. SUMMARY 
The number one significant benefit to cannabis legalization is the revenue stream 
it creates for both the private and public sectors. The industries in Colorado and 
Washington have both proven to be big revenue creators. The commercial aspect of the 
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industry has also had a beneficial trickle-down effect on tourism, travel, employment, and 
the real estate sectors in the states. Additionally, another apparent benefit of this trend is 
the potential to outcompete the cannabis black market by providing higher quality 
cannabis at a lower cost for production; thereby, creating a difficult environment in which 
the black market must compete. In contrast, access to banks is a difficult venture for the 
cannabis industry as a result of the federal level management of the banking system. 
Banks technically view cannabis revenue as proceeds from an illegal business.  
From a social perspective, the commercial nature of the industry primarily caters 
to habitual cannabis consumers; consequently, the long-term driver to operating this type 
of system is to gain new habitual users. In the near term, the industry, and government, 
advocates for youth education and addiction treatment, while in the long term, these 
efforts conflict with business goals and will potentially impede the number one driver of 
the industry, which is revenue creation. This trend parallels other industries, such as the 
tobacco business, where the health consequences are known and an aggressive education 
program is in place, yet as a result of profit motive, the business continues to thrive.  
Another negative effect of disparate legality of cannabis is the potential for 
diversion from the legal system to the black market in other prohibitionist locations. 
Interstate trafficking of illegal drugs has always been an issue in the United States. When 
a state legalizes a controlled substance, however, it effectively becomes a source state. 
Consequently, the decreased law enforcement burden in cannabis-legal states is 
transferred to prohibitionist states, which then fuels illegal behavior.  
Finally, from a crime perspective, some correlation appears to occur between 
legal cannabis and crime trends in the areas in which it has been legalized. From 2012 to 
2014, violent and property crime increased in Colorado and Washington, as compared to 
national averages, which decreased. Cannabis arrests decreased, as expected. Other types 
of drug crime appear to have remained stable with the exception of possession arrests for 
other dangerous non-narcotic drugs.  
During 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2015, city crime data from Seattle and Denver both 
demonstrate amplified figures as compared to federal data. In Denver and Seattle, both 
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property and person crime increased substantially, as compared with national averages. A 
subcategory of crime data in Denver, identified as society crime, increased 145.5%.157 It 
should be noted this category of crime includes drug crimes. Overall, during the period of 
measurement, crime in Seattle increased 13.3%, while crime in Denver increased 
45.8%.158  
Some concrete advantages and disadvantages result from cannabis legalization, 
but some level of unity must be guiding the process at the federal level, rather than 
relegating the management burden to the states. As the matter stands, no national 
cannabis policy exists to guide this trend. The next chapter concludes with 
recommendations that address identified disadvantages to the current system in an effort 
to minimize their impact. 
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VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Chapter I highlights two basic research questions. The first question seeks to 
determine benefits and drawbacks of legalized cannabis in Colorado and Washington. 
The second question seeks a workable approach to minimize the identified negative 
impacts of cannabis legalization. This chapter is structured to answer both questions, with 
each question addressed in its own subsection. The first section of this chapter addresses 
the benefits and drawbacks of cannabis legalization and how those potentially impact 
different stakeholders.  
B. BENEFITS AND DRAWBACKS OF CANNABIS LEGALIZATION 
Findings in this thesis indicate Washington and Colorado have generated an 
enormous revenue stream as a result of the commercial cannabis supply models in their 
states. These state economies are thriving in terms of real estate, employment, and tax 
revenue figures. While the successes of real estate and employment figures have room for 
interpretation in terms of varied causation, tax revenue figures are a direct result of sales 
of cannabis in both states. Cannabis is still a controlled substance, however, and 
technically, the federal government could intervene to stop these states. Nevertheless, it 
has not, which lends to disparity in the way different locations deal with regulation, 
finance, crime, and a host of other issues. These issues have been problematic at times 
with respect to prohibitionist states, especially ones that border cannabis-legal states.  
Crime in Colorado and Washington has increased in most areas, as compared with 
the rest of the United States, when measured prior to and after recreational legalization. 
This trend also held true at city levels in Seattle, Washington, and Denver, Colorado. As 
anticipated by the legalization of cannabis, drug crime indicated a decrease in cannabis-
related activity, although some minor offenses were still recorded, such as minors in 
possession or public use. Other hard drugs, such as cocaine, heroin, and synthetics, 
demonstrated stabilized activity. No evidence suggests the stable hard drug activity was 
caused by cannabis legalization. Presumably, the cannabis black market continues to 
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operate in prohibition areas. Thus, data suggests DTOs have not increased their 
trafficking of hard drugs in Colorado or Washington as a means to hedge cannabis losses. 
Additionally, hard drugs make up a relatively small portion of the illicit drug market and 
they continue to be high value targets of law enforcement. An increase in possession 
activity occurred in the other dangerous non-narcotic drugs category noted. It may be an 
indication of drug trafficking migration, or it may simply signify law enforcement 
activity is adjusting to the lack of cannabis enforcement and can put more effort toward 
these types of drugs.  
Causation between cannabis legalization in Colorado and Washington, and 
increases in crime levels, is difficult to establish. Many factors may influence crime rates. 
The FBI’s UCR program cites a variety of factors known to affect crime rates to include 
population, degree of urbanization, variations in population composition, transportation 
modes, economic conditions, and effectiveness of policing.159  
In addition to crime data, this thesis reviewed data prepared by RMHIDTA. The 
data revealed cannabis being sent through the mail and transported out of the state on 
highways has increased substantially. Interdiction of Colorado cannabis destined for 
other non-legal states demonstrates no control is exercised on what leaves cannabis-legal 
areas, which lends to the notion that it is difficult, if not impossible, to control the legal 
cannabis supply from spilling over into the black markets as a natural tendency in the 
competitive market. 
Thus, the argument is supported that prohibitionist states are negatively and 
significantly impacted when cannabis is legalized by other states. As a result of the CSA 
maintaining the federal prohibition, lax enforcement of the CSA at the federal level, and 
disparate state acceptance of cannabis, cannabis legal states become source states and 
they intensify cannabis black markets in prohibitionist states.  
At the national level, it will be difficult to strike a public policy balance between 
revenue generation, in cannabis-legal states, and public security, in prohibitionist states. 
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As the system currently stands, the federal government has given way to states’ rights, 
and tolerates state-level legalization, at the expense of those still prohibitionist states. In 
the next section, long and short-term policy recommendations are identified that may 
help address this dynamic more extensively.  
C. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
National level policy continues to be founded on international drug control 
conventions. The CSA, which is derived from the international controls put in place by 
the 1961 and 1988 UN Conventions, maintains cannabis as a Schedule I drug.160 In the 
case of cannabis, the most significant part of being a Schedule I controlled substance is 
that the drug has no medically approved use.161 It seems illogical, considering that over 
20 states have medical cannabis laws and regulatory infrastructures, with additional states 
slated to consider laws in 2016 and beyond. The next section addresses this contentious 
issue.  
1. Reschedule Cannabis under the CSA 
Much of the disparate approach to cannabis lies in the science behind it. Lacking 
the ability to conduct expansive scientific medical research helps perpetuate this attitude. 
Cannabis is already being used as a therapeutic treatment for various medical ailments; 
thusly, it should be downgraded to a Schedule II drug, which would allow for easier and 
more widespread scientific testing from public entities, such as hospitals, pharmacies, and 
practitioners.162 As a Schedule I drug, cannabis is viewed as having no medical value and 
the requirements to conduct medical research are much more of a barrier to the public 
entities listed previously. By virtue of being listed as a Schedule I drug, a level of 
aversion to medical research by institutional review boards and other researchers 
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permeates.163 A Schedule II designation would reduce this aversion among researchers 
and ease the requirements to conduct medical research on a wide basis, while allowing 
for the level of control on par with drugs, such as morphine. Morphine is known to help 
patients with pain, but is under strict control as a Schedule II drug because of its high 
potential for abuse. Cannabis is also used to control pain in many areas of the United 
States. 
Coinciding with the ability to conduct more scientific research on the drug, 
Schedule II designation also allows for continued tight controls over the substance at the 
federal level. As a reference, cocaine and methamphetamine are also listed as Schedule II 
substances. Three historical efforts have been made to downgrade cannabis within the 
CSA schedule. The DEA has denied each of these efforts. An additional petition for 
rescheduling was filed in 2011 and is currently pending DEA review.164 These denials 
highlight the effort would be an uphill battle via the executive branch (DEA). Congress 
can take a more direct route, however, via legislation, which holds promise for a more 
expedient resolution, as acceptance of cannabis continues to increase. As of November 
2015, Senator Bernard Sanders introduced the Ending Federal Marijuana Prohibition Act 
and the legislation is pending.165  
Even in the eventuality of Schedule II status for cannabis, a long road of research 
remains to determine if the drug actually has any medical applicability. Following 
additional research, cannabis will either be deemed to have medical applicability, or it 
will not. This outcome will allow governments to create a better drug control policy. 
Continuing on the current trajectory is not a feasible option for governments because 
decisions are being based on incomplete information, but change will not come 
overnight. While changing the CSA may take some time, some issues can be addressed 
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more immediately. In the near term, more should be done to address crime. The next 
section addresses this issue more extensively.  
2. Improve State Level Civil Asset Forfeiture 
A long-term need exists for additional scientific testing to determine if cannabis 
actually serves a medical purpose. In addition to this need, this thesis has demonstrated 
the potential for increased crime rates in response to legalization. A more immediate 
priority would be resourcing law enforcement agencies to address this potential issue. 
Certainly, within cannabis-legal states, cannabis tax revenues would be allocated 
accordingly based on the need within those states, but for prohibitionist states, the issue is 
more complex. Cannabis-legal states have deprioritized cannabis legalization and become 
source states for possession, manufacture, and distribution. In prohibitionist states, 
diversion and proliferation of cannabis can create a resource issue not caused by that 
state. 
In response to this phenomenon, prohibitionist states need new law enforcement 
tools for their state, county, and municipal law enforcement officers. Historically, 
individual states, often with the assistance of federal law enforcement officers, have 
leveraged civil asset forfeiture programs to impede drug trafficking. When working in 
conjunction with federal authorities, the process of equitable sharing was applied, which 
states that federal law enforcement authority could be used in joint law enforcement 
operations as long as at least 20% of total assets seized went to the federal 
government.166 Equitable sharing was leveraged to assist state and local agencies in 
circumventing more stringent forfeiture laws in their respective states. As of 2015, new 
rules at the DOJ limit this activity and make it more difficult for state and local agencies 
to leverage asset forfeiture programs.167  
The most sensible short-term recommendation to assist states in this area is to 
grant states greater leeway in the application of asset forfeiture operations as they pertain 
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to cannabis smuggling. The goal of this effort is to change smuggling behaviors from 
cannabis-legal states to prohibitionist states and to support law enforcement agencies 
with the resources they need to fulfill their mission. Decreasing the asset forfeiture 
threshold for individual states and eliminating the need for them to act with federal law 
enforcement agencies is a logical first step toward countering the negative burden placed 
on them by cannabis-legal states. Following implementation of this recommendation, 
additional research will be needed to determine how effectively this option impacts 
smuggling efforts out of cannabis-legal states.  
In summary, long and short-term approaches to disparity in cannabis control in 
the United States need to be developed. A long-term approach to the cannabis issue is to 
study the drug more extensively, but such study would require the drug to be downgraded 
from Schedule I to Schedule II. This downgrade can be accomplished within the 
executive branch, but a more direct route would be a legislative remedy provided by a 
congressional act. In the meantime, change at the federal level is not indicated at all, 
which leaves states to continue on the current path, while states’ rights versus the 
federalism issue continue. To assist prohibitionist states that have taken on the added 
enforcement burden from cannabis-legal states, more streamlined and expeditious asset 
forfeiture authority should be granted. These recommendations promote additional 
scientific research on cannabis, while allowing states to maintain control of their own 
drug crime issues. Certainly, both recommendations will require additional evaluation, 
but the trend is relatively new and this aspect limits some of the research to this point. In 
the next section, some of the additional research limitations associated with this thesis are 
addressed.  
D. RESEARCH LIMITATIONS 
Many aspects of cannabis legalization remain ambiguous as a result of the 
relatively new trend. Within the United States, medical cannabis regulations have been 
somewhat easily implemented and an adequate time period has been available to study 
many of the effects of the trend. A significant limitation to research in this area is the 
relatively short duration of time that has passed since recreational cannabis laws have 
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been emplaced. It will take a significantly longer amount of time to assess more 
accurately what works and what does not. Proper structuring of systems that regulate 
legal cannabis supply and distribution will take years to implement following extensive 
research.  
At the top tier of the drug control hierarchy in the United States have been various 
agencies of the federal government. Cannabis being a controlled substance means the 
DEA has historically dealt with control of the drug. With the gradual implementation of 
medical cannabis regulations and laws, and eventual legalization at the state levels of 
recreational cannabis, the DEA, at the behest of the DOJ, has slowly withdrawn itself 
from low-level cannabis drug crime. In cannabis-legal states, the DEA, under the 
guidance of the Ogden and Cole Memos, actually enables the legal cannabis markets by 
debilitating DTOs’ ability to compete or participate with licit markets; another 
disincentive for DTOs. While serving cannabis-legal states, it is difficult to ascertain the 
magnitude of impact it is having on prohibition states. For purposes of this study, the 
RMHIDTA was the only resource available that could provide limited statistical 
reporting on the amount of legal cannabis being interdicted in other non-legal cannabis 
states.  
Population growth in geographic areas of study limited the ability to measure 
criminal activity more precisely. For example, the population of the United States grew 
3% between 2012 and 2015. In Colorado during the same period, a 10.5% increase was 
experienced, and in Washington, a 25.5% increase.168 As a result of fluctuating 
populations and methods of data collection from location to location, the actual crime 
figures may vary.  
Drug crime activity as listed in the FBI’s UCR was provided by region only. The 
ability to collect exact drug figures for individual states was not possible at the level of 
detail provided by region in the FBI’s UCR. It delineated arrests by drug type, which 
allowed for a more thorough analysis of migration from one drug, namely cannabis, to 
others. Although the region accounted for both Washington and Colorado, it also 
                                                 
168 “Arrests by State 2012 Table 69”; “Arrests by State 2013 Table 69”; “Arrests by State 2014 Table 
69.” 
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accounted for 10 additional states in the area. At the city level, Denver was the only city 
that collected statistical information relating to drug crime. Drug crime in Denver was not 
delineated by drug type; rather, all types of drugs were grouped into this category.  
E. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Revenue generation from legal cannabis has proven to be the driving force behind 
Colorado’s and Washington’s commercial models of supply and distribution. In late 
2015, both states experienced a plateau in earnings, which may indicate the limit of the 
market share this industry will extend to has been reached. In other words, the bulk of 
cannabis users who will partake of this market have been reached and incremental 
earning levels will not increase as compared to earlier periods of time. If the market has 
not reached its peak, it would be worthy to research the size of the legal cannabis market 
over time, and also ascertain how effective regulation positively influences this market 
size.  
Assuming the market has reached its peak, it would be worthy to assess what 
impact youth drug education and treatment programs will have on future market sizes in 
cannabis-legal states. States currently fund these types of programs from cannabis tax 
revenues. If the programs are effective at preventing future users, it may have a negative 
impact on future cannabis market sizes that research may further reveal.  
The administration of the CSA looks to be cumbersome and rigid as it pertains to 
rescheduling drugs, which is readily apparent given the amount of time it has taken to 
revisit the cannabis rescheduling issue in the past. Given that state governments are now 
self-legislating around the CSA, additional research is warranted to determine what 
ethical considerations are at play when contemplating whether to legalize recreational 
drugs for profit. It will take some time to learn the health implications of legalizing 
cannabis, but in the event they follow a similar course as alcohol and tobacco, studying 
the benefit of profit, as compared with public health, is a laudable academic endeavor.  
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F. CONCLUSION 
No silver bullet to this problem exists because of tradeoffs that go along with the 
options. Cannabis has been a controlled substance for many years because at one point, it 
was proven to be harmful and have no medical value. It has been researched extensively 
over the years and has not been found to be a widely accepted medical treatment. 
Moreover, cannabis advocates are perceived by the mainstream as leveraging the medical 
aspect of cannabis use as a means to access the federally controlled substance for 
recreation.  
On the other side of the debate is the position that cannabis is a harmful, criminal, 
societal detractor. Based on historical science and critical narrative, the position is 
justified.169 Plenty of polls support the narrative on both sides, but the fact that the issue 
is so divisive lends to the idea that the federal government has not taken responsibility for 
getting out in front of the issue. This lack of responsiveness is clearly evident in the way 
individual states are navigating around a paralyzed, rigid federal government.  
One consideration both sides of the debate should agree on is the need for 
definitive scientific study behind the drug. By downgrading cannabis to a Schedule II 
drug, both sides of the debate would know the benefits and risks associated with use. 
Proponents would better understand addiction, overdose, and chronic disease risks, as 
well as the true application of the drug as a treatment and whether it actually helps 
medically. Opponents of the drug could use scientific data to craft better public policies 
at all levels of government, including the implementation of a coherent and enforced 
federal cannabis policy. Until additional scientific research can be done outside of the 
federal government, the issue will continue to be divisive. In the meantime, both sides of 
the argument should appreciate state sovereignty. States should have the ability to 
enforce their own sovereign laws regardless of neighboring state cannabis laws. If 
individual states have the right to legalize a controlled substance locally, then 
neighboring states should have the right to enact measures that help secure their own 
population. 
                                                 
169 Volkow et al., “Adverse Health Effects of Marijuana Use.” 
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APPENDIX: ASPECTS OF CANNABIS REGULATION IN 
COLORADO AND WASHINGTON 
 
Sources: “FAQs on I-502,” December 17, 2012, http://lcb.wa.gov/marijuana/faqs_i-502; 
“Marijuana Enforcement,” accessed December 20, 2014, https://www.colorado. 
gov/pacific/enforcement/marijuanaenforcement; Bryce Pardo, “Cannabis Policy Reforms 
in the Americas: A Comparative Analysis of Colorado, Washington, and Uruguay,” 
International Journal of Drug Policy 25, no. 4 (July 2014): 727–35, doi:10.1016/j. 
drugpo.2014.05.010. 
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